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INTRODUCTION 
For more than two centuries, Presidents of the United States 
have sought to oversee the regulatory state.1 Since about 1980, 
presidential oversight has become centralized in the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).2 Under a series of 
executive orders, Presidents of both political parties have re-
quired federal regulatory agencies to assess the benefits and 
costs of important regulations, and to submit the resulting reg-
ulatory impact assessments to OIRA for review. 
Although OIRA review has become a settled feature of the 
American regulatory state, concerns have recently been raised 
                                                                                                                               
 1. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITU-
TION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); 
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 (1995). 
 2. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 3. 
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that regulatory agencies might be trying to avoid it.3 Agencies 
may face incentives to avoid OIRA oversight if they find it bur-
densome or irksome. Avoidance of OIRA review might occur in 
several ways; for example, agencies might frame regulatory ac-
tions to slip below OIRA’s thresholds for review, or shift sub-
stantive policy decisions into documents or forms of agency ac-
tion that are not subject to OIRA review, or write impact assess-
assessments in ways that make review difficult, or run out the 
clock so that OIRA review is truncated by legal deadlines or the 
end of a presidential term.4 Agencies also might enlist other reg-
ulators, such as state institutions, to act in place of federal agen-
cies.5 Finally, some entire agencies (dubbed “independent” 
agencies) have historically operated outside the OIRA review 
process.6 Normative appraisals of agency avoidance vary; advo-
cates of presidential oversight through OIRA see it as a problem, 
while critics of such oversight see it as a welcome development. 
The concerns about agency avoidance have raised the ques-
tion whether response measures are warranted to buttress OI-
RA review. For example, OIRA might broaden the scope of its 
review by lowering its thresholds, expanding the types of 
agency actions it reviews, or conducting spot checks to catch 
attempts at avoidance. OIRA could also be given more funding 
and staff to carry out its reviews. Courts could encourage 
agencies to undergo OIRA review by adjusting judicial review 
to take account of whether or not OIRA has completed a re-
view. In general, advocates of OIRA review seem likely to fa-
                                                                                                                               
 3. See, e.g., Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Federal Regulations and Regula-
tory Reform Under the Obama Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Communal & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 29 (2012) 
(statement of John D. Graham, Dean, Ind. Univ. Sch. of Pub. & Envtl. Affairs) [here-
inafter Graham Testimony]; Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential 
Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1757–58 (2013); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 994, 995 (2011). More generally, one observer reports “outrage” at agencies’ use 
of nonlegislative rules to avoid review. See William Funk, Legislating for Nonlegisla-
tive Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2004). 
 4. See Nou, supra note 3, 1782–98. 
 5. See Graham Testimony, supra note 3, at 27–28. 
 6. See e.g., Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Federal Regulations and Regula-
tory Reform Under the Obama Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Communal & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 36–41 (2012) 
(statement of Sally Katzen, Visiting Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law) [here-
inafter Katzen Testimony]. 
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vor stronger responses; critics of OIRA review seem likely to 
prefer milder responses or none at all. 
In this Article, we take no position on whether agency avoid-
ance of OIRA is a crisis or a mirage (or something in between), 
or on which specific responses are warranted, if any. Rather, in 
Part III, we propose a path that seems to have been overlooked 
in the debate, yet should be prominent: response measures to 
address agency avoidance of OIRA should, in principle, be eval-
uated in a systematic fashion, similar in concept to the way OI-
RA evaluates agency regulations. This evaluation should con-
sider alternative response options—including no action—and 
their important impacts, which are discussed further in Part III. 
Because response options and their enforcement may be costly, 
and OIRA’s resources are limited,7 the optimal level of enforce-
ment of OIRA oversight is likely to tolerate some avoidance—
just as optimal regulation tolerates some acceptable risk rather 
than trying to eliminate all risk or ensure perfect enforcement. 
Our proposal frames the problem of agency avoidance and 
response measures as a problem of optimal regulation—not 
only optimal agency regulation of private activities, but also 
optimal OIRA regulation of agencies. Our proposal requires 
consideration of questions very similar to those now raised in 
OIRA review of agency regulations, notably: 
 How serious is the problem of agency avoidance? Alt-
hough there may be salient examples of avoidance, a 
more comprehensive assessment of the extent of 
avoidance, its likelihood, and its consequences would 
be helpful for understanding the scope and severity of 
the issue for the regulatory system and society. 
 What are the plausible alternative response options? 
The evaluation of this question should include a 
range of alternative response options, including the 
option of no action. 
                                                                                                                               
 7. Nou, supra note 3, at 1814–15 (noting that the President may have good reasons 
not to “maximize control” of the agencies, because his “resources [are] constrained” 
and he must be “selective” in requiring review). Nou also argues that relaxed review 
might be a bargaining chip that the President could offer to an agency or a constituen-
cy favoring some regulation. Id. at 1815. But she does not expressly advocate a thor-
ough assessment of the benefits or costs of attempting to address agency avoidance. 
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 What are the benefits, costs, and other impacts of 
these alternative response options? 
Some preliminary comments may be helpful regarding these 
key questions. First, it remains unclear whether avoidance of 
OIRA is actually widespread and serious. The answer to the 
first question above depends on the type of avoidance. Agen-
cies may have good reasons and incentives to cooperate with 
OIRA review. Agencies’ incentives to cooperate or avoid might 
differ when they are facing OIRA review as compared to judi-
cial review, when they are weighing different types of avoid-
ance tactics, and when they are anticipating different potential 
responses to avoidance. Further empirical analysis is needed to 
understand how often agencies actually avoid OIRA review, in 
what ways, and with what consequences.8 A few examples are 
insufficient; anecdotes could be atypical outliers—or the tip of 
a large iceberg. Some examples used to illustrate avoidance 
may (by virtue of having been identified) also illustrate that 
avoidance can be found out and remedied.9 Some recent at-
tempts at empirical analysis of larger data sets have found little 
evidence that agencies are significantly avoiding OIRA re-
view.10 Still, it remains possible that avoidance may be occur-
                                                                                                                               
 8. Id. at 1836 (agreeing that the question is “empirical”). Nou cites examples, but she 
does not present evidence that agency avoidance (“self-insulation”) is widespread, nor 
does she explore which type(s) may be more prevalent than others. See id. 
 9. E.g., id. at 1819–20 (recounting an episode in 1993 in which labeling require-
ments for meat and poultry were reported in the Washington Post but had not been 
sent to OIRA for review, prompting the OIRA Administrator to call the agency and 
insist on review or withdrawal, whereupon the agency submitted the rule for OIRA 
review). This example is also cited in OIRA Avoidance, supra note 3, at 1005. A more 
recent example is discussed in Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Bene-
fits and the Affordable Care Act: Law and Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 443 
(2014) (discussing the Department of Health and Human Services allowing states to 
define “essential health benefits”). 
 10. See Connor N. Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Doc-
uments, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 821 (2010) (finding that use of guidance documents to 
avoid notice-and-comment procedures has been “overstated” and “overgeneral-
ize[d] from a few egregious examples”); Alex Acs & Charles M. Cameron, Does 
White House Regulatory Review Produ  ce a Chilling Effect and “OIRA Avoidance” in the 
Agencies?, 44 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with Princeton Uni-
versity) (finding no significant reduction in historical rates of economically signifi-
cant rulemaking when subject to OIRA review). On the other hand, some research 
has found that agencies may try to avoid analytic requirements subject to judicial (as 
opposed to OIRA) review, at least where the risk of legal sanctions for such avoid-
ance is low. See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures (2013) 
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ring in just a few—but important—cases, or at just a few agen-
cies,11 or that it is occurring more often, but in ways that these 
studies have not captured. 
Second, different types of avoidance may be more or less 
likely to occur than previous studies have suggested, once re-
peated interactions with OIRA over time are taken into ac-
count. To help identify the kinds of agency avoidance of OIRA 
review that deserve further empirical evidence, this Article of-
fers a broader typology of the many types of agency avoidance 
of OIRA review that might occur. We need a more complete 
typology of avoidance tactics, and the incentives driving agen-
cies to choose among these types, in order to understand and 
estimate the significance of the issue. In our typology, we also 
comment on which avoidance tactics appear to be more likely 
to circumvent OIRA oversight successfully. We move beyond 
prior literature by identifying not only a broader array of 
avoidance tactics, but also potential response options that 
could be used as countermoves to each avoidance tactic. Agen-
cy anticipation of detection, as well as the imposition of re-
sponse measures, may deter initial agency avoidance. Drawing 
on game-theory analyses, we situate agency avoidance and re-
sponse measures within a repeat-player relationship. 
As a result, we suggest that the avoidance tactics on which 
there has been the most scholarly focus so far may turn out to be 
relatively less likely to escape OIRA review and response in 
practice, because OIRA and the agency have repeated interac-
tions over time regarding these types of tactics. These tactics in-
clude the use of guidance documents instead of rules and at-
tempts to understate the economic significance of rules or to 
split rules into smaller pieces so as to slip below the threshold 
                                                                                                                               
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding some agency avoidance of 
requirements under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and under the Unfunded Man-
dates Reform Act, and inferring that avoidance is more likely where the litigation 
risk of avoidance is low). Other analyses have debated whether judicial review in-
duces delays in rulemaking. Compare Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, 
Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume 
and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1421 (2012), with Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1494 (2012). 
 11. E.g., Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the 
FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2014) (arguing that the FDA frequently uses 
guidance documents to avoid review). 
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for review. At the same time, other tactics, such as the use of 
agency enforcement powers and litigation settlements that com-
pel the agency to regulate, may turn out to be more likely to es-
cape OIRA oversight because they are more difficult for OIRA to 
detect or address. These are our conjectures; more empirical 
study is needed to understand the frequency of each tactic, the 
likelihood of its use escaping oversight, the influence of respons-
es and repeat playing, and the consequences of avoidance. 
Third, even if agency avoidance of OIRA is significant, it re-
mains an open question which remedies, if any, would be war-
ranted in response. The proper remedy depends on the incen-
tives of the actors, the type of avoidance and the consequences 
of each potential response option. As noted above, a good 
evaluation of response options to agency avoidance requires 
consideration of alternative response options (including no ac-
tion) and their important impacts, both adverse and beneficial. 
Thus, in principle, responses to agency avoidance should be 
evaluated similarly in concept to the way that OIRA would 
evaluate agency regulations. 
Further, the evaluation of response options needs to take ac-
count of the dynamic relationship between OIRA and the agen-
cies. The very existence of agency avoidance implies that the 
agency is a strategic actor. OIRA is also a strategic actor. The 
agency may react to OIRA’s oversight response measure by 
complying, or by shifting to a new avoidance tactic.12 This dy-
namic relationship makes the evaluation of response options 
more complex. Repeat players in a multi-round game may co-
operate more, or agencies may select avoidance tactics that are 
less likely to be detected by OIRA over time. The reality that 
the White House—and the agency—is a “they” and not an “it” 
multiplies the number of strategic players in this game. These 
multiple moving parts must be assessed as an interdependent 
                                                                                                                               
 12. See Raso, Strategic or Sincere?, supra note 10, at 822 (arguing that greater OIRA 
review of agency guidance documents could drive agencies to rely more on adjudi-
cation); Stuart Shapiro, Agency Oversight as “Whac-a-Mole”: The Challenge of Restrict-
ing Agency Use of Nonlegislative Rules, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 (2014) (arguing 
that greater OIRA review of agency nonlegislative rulemaking could drive agencies 
to adopt even more difficult-to-monitor policy-setting tools). 
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dynamic system. Review may elicit avoidance; likewise, a re-
sponse to avoidance may elicit a countermove.13 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a back-
ground of the system of presidential oversight of regulation 
through OIRA review. Part II analyzes: (1) the incentives for 
agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA, (2) a broad array of 
agency avoidance tactics, and (3) corresponding response op-
tions (especially in a repeat-player relationship). Part III argues 
that response options to agency avoidance should not be un-
questioningly pursued or rejected. Instead, they should be 
evaluated using many of the same principles OIRA employs in 
reviewing agency regulation, including a systematic considera-
tion of the benefits and costs of particular response actions and 
a comparison with alternatives. 
I. PRESIDENTIAL OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY REGULATION 
THROUGH OIRA REVIEW 
The presidential use of centralized regulatory review, through 
OIRA, for managing executive-branch agencies is now well es-
tablished. As readers already familiar with OIRA review will 
know, the institutionalization of the systematic review process 
began with Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, all of whom 
took steps to oversee agency action more closely.14 For example, 
President Nixon set up a “Quality of Life” review process in 
1971, centered at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
in which OMB circulated environmental, consumer protection, 
and occupational safety rules to other agencies for comment.15 
                                                                                                                               
 13. Nou, supra note 3, at 1814 (calling the selection of response options “the other 
half of the game”—the first half being agency avoidance). Nou cites several re-
sponse options, but she does not evaluate response options in terms of the further 
countermoves they may trigger or their overall costs and benefits. See id. 
 14. According to longtime OIRA official Jim Tozzi, the seeds of centralized regula-
tory review were actually sown in the Johnson Administration, though not initiated 
in practice until the Nixon Administration. See Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: 
The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 40–41 (2011). 
 15. John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush 
Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 956–57 (2006); Memorandum from 
George P. Shultz, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Dep’ts & Agencies 
(Oct. 5, 1971) [hereinafter Shultz 1971 Memorandum], available at http:// 
www.thecre.com/ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm, [http://perma.cc/0MVmX9tqSoY]. 
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Presidents Ford and Carter expanded the overlay of require-
ments on agency rulemaking by requiring additional analyses. 
President Ford required analysis of impacts on inflation,16 and 
President Carter issued Executive Order 12,044 requiring cost-
benefit analyses (CBA) for rules with “major economic conse-
quences.”17 These early oversight efforts anticipated two key ob-
jectives of current presidential review structures: improving the 
quality and rationality of agency analysis, and ensuring agency 
consistency with broader presidential priorities. 
Congress created OIRA within OMB, with the support of the 
Carter administration, through the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1980.18 The Carter administration previously had reviewed 
agency CBAs through the Regulatory Analysis Review Group 
(RARG), a collection of experts from various offices, but not yet 
a centralized standing oversight body. In the first month after 
taking office in 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 
12,291, formally centralizing White House review of agency 
rulemaking in OMB/OIRA.19 Agencies were to submit pro-
posed and final rules to OIRA—accompanied by regulatory 
impact assessments (RIAs)—before publication in the Federal 
Register, and they were ordered to refrain from publishing rules 
until OIRA concluded its review.20 
Executive Order 12,291 institutionalized two other key ele-
ments of presidential review of rulemaking. First, it added a 
new set of analytical requirements on rulemaking to those al-
ready imposed by statute. In the regulatory review process for 
so-called “major” rules, agencies were to prepare, submit, and 
“to the extent permitted by law consider” the Regulatory Im-
pact Analyses, assessing each rule’s expected costs and bene-
fits.21 Second, it formalized the goal that executive agencies, in 
regulating, were to be explicitly guided not just by authorizing 
                                                                                                                               
 16. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 29, 1974) (requiring prep-
aration of inflation impact statements). 
 17. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978) (requiring de-
tailed regulatory analysis of rules with “major economic consequences”). 
 18. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, § 2, 94 Stat. 2812 
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2006)) (creating the Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs in new 44 U.S.C. § 3503). 
 19. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 20. Id. § 3(f). 
 21. Id. § 3(a), (d). 
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statutes but by overarching presidential priorities, notably to 
ensure that “benefits . . . outweigh . . . costs” and to “maximize 
the net benefits” to society.22 Broadly understood, this might 
also encompass making sure that diverse regulatory agencies 
work in a coordinated fashion, or at least not at cross-purposes. 
Regulatory review by OIRA, a White House office headed by 
an administrator appointed by the President (with Senate con-
firmation), would effectuate these goals.23 
This regulatory review structure has been consistently main-
tained and reaffirmed—and from time to time extended—by 
each President since Reagan. President Clinton’s Executive Or-
der 12,86624 replaced Executive Order 12,291, while retaining 
and reinforcing each of these three key elements (centralized re-
view, a set of analytical requirements, and an express focus on 
presidential priorities). The Clinton Executive Order continued 
to direct executive agencies to refrain from publication of pro-
posed or final rules until completion of OIRA review, though it 
limited regulatory review as well as regulatory-analysis re-
quirements to “significant” rules.25 These included rules with an 
economic impact of $100 million or more (“economically signifi-
cant” rules), and those raising novel legal or policy issues, 
among others.26 The Order also permitted OIRA to determine, 
over an agency’s disagreement, that a particular regulation was 
indeed “significant” and thus subject to review.27 Regulatory re-
view was to be completed within 90 days, with narrow excep-
tions.28 The Clinton Executive Order fortified centralized White 
                                                                                                                               
 22. E.g., id. § 2 (“In promulgating new regulations . . . all agencies, to the extent 
permitted by law, shall adhere to the following requirements: . . . Agencies shall set 
regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the aggregate net benefits to socie-
ty, taking into account the condition of the particular industries affected by regula-
tions, the condition of the national economy, and other regulatory actions contem-
plated for the future.”). 
 23. Senate confirmation of the OIRA administrator was established by the 1986 
Amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act. Paperwork Reduction Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 § 813, 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006). 
 24. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 25. See id. § 4. Executive Order No. 12,866 also requires review of other agency 
actions expected to lead to the issuance of a final rule, including notices of inquiry 
and advance notices of proposed rulemaking. See id. § 3(e). 
 26. Id. § 3(f). 
 27. Id. § 6(a)(3)(A). 
 28. Id. § 6(b)(2). 
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House control by expressly providing that unresolved conflicts 
between the regulating agency and other agencies (including 
OMB) would ultimately be resolved by the President or Vice 
President.29 Clinton’s Order also somewhat enlarged the scope 
of CBA and the exercise of judgment in CBA by replacing the 
word “outweigh” with “justify” (i.e., “benefits . . . justify its 
costs”), and by including attention to qualitative impacts, distri-
butional impacts, and impacts on health, safety, and the envi-
ronment.30 The maximization of net social benefits, however, 
remained as the objective.31 The Order also called for greater 
transparency in OIRA’s activities and outside contacts, requiring 
disclosure of changes made during review and documents ex-
changed by OIRA and the agency. 
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama retained the 
Clinton Executive Order, further cementing the bipartisan con-
sensus across administrations in favor of centralized regulatory 
oversight through OIRA.32 President George W. Bush’s OMB 
issued Circular A-4, providing highly detailed guidance to the 
agencies on the key elements of a “good regulatory analysis” 
under Executive Order 12,866, including a clear baseline for 
comparative purposes, specifically stated assumptions, an as-
sessment of the sensitivity of the analytical results to changes in 
                                                                                                                               
 29. Id. § 7. But see Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the 
Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (rather than funneling disputes between OIRA and an 
agency to the Vice President, the resolution of disputes during the Obama admin-
istration was “far messier and more ill-defined”). 
 30. Exec. Order No. 12,866 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,733 § 1. 
 31. Id. 
 32. The bipartisan consensus is reflected in the decisions of every President, re-
gardless of political party, since the 1970s (Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. 
W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama) to favor presidential oversight 
through centralized review (through OIRA since 1981). It is also reflected in the 
writings of eminent judges who also served in government and academia and were 
appointed by Presidents of both parties. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE 
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (former counsel at the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, appointed to the First Circuit by President Carter, and 
later appointed to the Supreme Court by President Clinton); Elena Kagan, Presiden-
tial Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (former White House official in the 
Clinton Administration and later appointed to the Supreme Court by President 
Obama); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 877 (2010) (Ginsburg served as OIRA Administrator and then was 
appointed by Reagan to the D.C. Circuit). 
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those assumptions, and attention to ancillary impacts.33 Late in 
his second term, President George W. Bush also issued an Exec-
utive Order that, among other elements, called for OIRA to re-
view agency guidance documents along with rules34—an indica-
tion of mounting concern about agency avoidance of OIRA. 
President Obama has continued to emphasize that “central-
ized review is both legitimate and appropriate as a means of 
promoting regulatory goals.”35 He reaffirmed the importance of 
regulatory review as a device for a “dispassionate and analyti-
cal ‘second opinion’ on agency actions.”36 He retained the Clin-
ton Executive Order, and strengthened it with additional or-
ders directing agencies to undertake retrospective review of 
existing rules to reduce regulatory burdens, strongly encourag-
ing the so-called “independent regulatory agencies” to partici-
pate in that retrospective review, and directing agencies to 
promote international regulatory cooperation.37 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Presidents have consistently en-
dorsed the idea that presidential priorities should guide and 
constrain agency rulemaking. Executive Order No. 12,866, 
though stating that it “reaffirm[s] the primacy of Federal agen-
cies” in the rulemaking process,38 asks agencies to explain how 
proposed actions will be consistent with the President’s priori-
ties and expressly tasks OIRA with reviewing each proposed 
rule to ensure consistency with those priorities.39 President 
Obama similarly has emphasized that regulatory review 
                                                                                                                               
 33. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_ 
matters_pdf/a-4.pdf, [http://perma.cc/08veaodUWNM]; Nou, supra note 3, at 1793–94. 
 34. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007) (later rescinded by 
President Obama in Jan. 2009). 
 35. Regulatory Review: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009). 
 36. Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 14, 2011); Exec. 
Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
 37. See Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 14, 2012) (reducing regu-
latory burdens); Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 4, 2012) (interna-
tional regulatory cooperation); Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 
2011) (independent agencies); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 
2011) (retrospective reviews). 
 38. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 39. Id. § 6(b). 
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should “ensure consistency with Presidential priorities.”40 Reg-
ulatory review has thus joined the appointment and removal 
powers as a means for the President to prompt agency respon-
siveness to presidential goals.41 
The scope of regulatory review has also grown over time in a 
number of respects. First, some agency actions that are not offi-
cially labeled “rules” may nonetheless be subject to OIRA re-
view if they have large impacts. In Executive Order 13,422, Pres-
ident George W. Bush ordered agencies to submit significant 
guidance documents, as well as rules, for regulatory review.42 
Although President Obama formally revoked that executive or-
der,43 OMB and OIRA have continued to assert the authority to 
review significant policy and guidance documents.44  
Second, the set of agencies subject to OIRA review may be 
growing. Specific agencies have been created, or their rulemak-
ing functions enlarged, such as the Department of Homeland 
Security after 9/11. Although Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,866 
expressly exclude “independent agencies” from centralized reg-
ulatory review,45 commentators have criticized making such a 
distinction between executive-branch agencies and independent 
                                                                                                                               
 40. Regulatory Review, supra note 35. We note that OIRA can and does also give 
input to presidential decisions on major policy issues through other White House 
deliberative avenues that are separate from OIRA’s role in reviewing agency rules 
and RIAs under the Executive Order. 
 41. See Kagan, supra note 32, at 2282 (commenting on Clinton’s use of OMB review 
to “convert[] administrative activity into an extension of his own policy and political 
agenda”); cf. Stuart Shapiro, Unequal Partners: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive 
Review of Regulations, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10433 (2005) (highlighting the challenge in 
melding two potentially different objectives—“maximizing net benefits” and ad-
vancing the president’s policy priorities—in the same regulatory oversight process). 
 42. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2763–64 (Jan. 23, 2007). 
 43. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009). 
 44. See Guidance for Regulatory Review, Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag to the 
Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_ 
fy2009/m09-13.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0v7MyocpEnX]; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 
1853–54 (2013) (stating that under Executive Order 12,866 OIRA has “unambiguous[]” 
authority to review guidance documents that lead to rules, and also has a long under-
standing, reaffirmed in the Memorandum from Peter Orszag of Mar. 4, 2009, that free-
standing guidance documents may be reviewed by OIRA if they are “significant” and 
even if they would be exempt from public notice and comment under the APA). 
 45. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg., 51,737 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec. Order No. 
12,291, 46 Fed. Reg., 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981). 
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agencies.46 President Obama’s Executive Order 13,579, issued in 
July 2011, though not insisting on extending regulatory review 
obligations to independent agencies, did state that “independent 
regulatory agencies should comply” with regulatory require-
ments imposed by earlier executive orders, including require-
ments for public participation, science, regulatory analysis, and 
retrospective internal review of existing regulations.47 A number 
of independent agencies appear to have at least done some ret-
rospective review and cost-benefit analysis in response.48 Full-
blown regulatory review for independent agencies is on the 
                                                                                                                               
 46. For advocacy of greater inclusion of independent agencies under OIRA re-
view, see Katzen Testimony, supra note 6, at 36–37. Meanwhile, scholars continue to 
debate whether the agencies with restrictions on presidential removal of their heads 
are truly “independent” or instead should also be considered subject to presidential 
direction along with other executive agencies. See generally Kirti Datla & Richard L. 
Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 769 (2013) (arguing for an end to the distinction and for all agencies to be sub-
ject to presidential oversight); Note, The SEC Is Not an Independent Agency, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 781 (2013) (arguing that a President could remove an SEC Commissioner 
without cause and a reviewing court would uphold the removal). Finally, the offi-
cial position of the American Bar Association is that regulatory review and cost-
benefit requirements should extend to independent agencies. Letter from Thomas 
M. Susman, Dir. Am. Bar Ass’n Governmental Affairs Office, to Senators Thomas 
Carper and Tom Coburn (Sept. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013Sept16_ind
regagencies_1.authcheckdam.pef, [http://perma.cc/NY-7WLG]. 
 Military and foreign affairs rules are also exempted from review, see Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, although agencies (such as the State Department) are expected to consult 
with OIRA before making regulatory commitments in international agreements, see 
Publication, Coordination, and Reporting of International Agreements: Amend-
ments, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,831 (proposed May 18, 2006) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 181), as 
they also must before making budget commitments, see 22 C.F.R. § 181.4(e). It re-
mains unclear to what degree regulatory commitments in international agreements 
are actually submitted to OIRA for ex ante review. 
 47. Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587, 41, 587 (July 14, 2011). 
 48. See generally CURTIS W. COPELAND, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INDEPENDENT 
REGULATORY AGENCIES (2013) (surveying cross-cutting and agency-specific analyti-
cal requirements that apply to independent regulatory agencies). For example, the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission is required to prepare a CBA for some rules, 
while the Federal Communications Commission is not. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission has developed its own guidelines on economic analysis of rulemaking. 
See Memorandum from RSFI and OGC to Staff of the Rulewriting Divisions and 
Offices (Mar. 16, 2012) (noting the stimuli of court decisions interpreting the SEC’s 
authorizing legislation, congressional interest, and Executive Order 13,579); Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Preliminary Plan for Retrospec-
tive Analysis of Existing Rules, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,462 (Dec. 28, 2011) (FCC plan in 
compliance with Executive Order 13,579). 
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horizon, though its arrival will depend on several factors, in-
cluding legal reasoning, presidential elections, presidential rela-
tions with Congress, and the perceived burden of regulations 
issued by the independent agencies.49  
Third, inflation, combined with inertia, has also caused the 
coverage of regulatory review to grow. President Reagan’s Ex-
ecutive Order 12,291 defined “major rules” subject to regulato-
ry impact analysis requirements to include rules with over $100 
million of impact on the economy. That definition of what is 
now termed an “economically significant” rule under the Clin-
ton Executive Order has not been updated,50 even though a rule 
with a $100 million impact in 2013 dollars would have had a 
significantly smaller impact in 1981 dollars.51 Perhaps that re-
flects a tacit but conscious decision to review even smaller rules 
as inflation shrinks the impact threshold over time. Moreover, 
the definition of economic significance probably is not very 
limiting anyway. As Professor Cass Sunstein has reported, over 
80% of OIRA-reviewed rules are reviewed for reasons other 
than economic significance, further broadening the scope of 
rules subject to review.52 It remains true, however, that eco-
nomically significant rules are subjected to more extensive OI-
RA review, and agencies are obligated to prepare more exten-
sive analyses for these rules.53 On the other hand, these three 
                                                                                                                               
 49. See infra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing bill pending in Con-
gress that would confirm the President’s authority to review independent agency 
regulations). 
 50. See Regulatory Impact Analysis: Frequently Asked Questions, WHITE HOUSE, 2 
(Feb. 7 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/OMB/ 
circulars/a004/a-4_FAQ.pdf, [http://perma.cc/07vZNmW66N2]. 
 51. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a rule with a $100 million impact 
in 2013 would only have had an impact of $39 million in 1981, thus not subjecting it 
to regulatory review. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm, [http://perma.cc/0FShbnaE6TM]. 
 52. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1868 (“[M]ore than eighty percent of rules re-
viewed by OIRA are not economically significant, in the sense that they do not have an 
annual economic impact of at least $100 million.”). Executive Order 12,866 authorizes 
OIRA review of rules on grounds other than economic significance. Sunstein notes 
that “rules that are not economically significant need not have a Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, which is the most formal and detailed assessment of both costs and bene-
fits.” Id. at 1868; see also Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 17–18 (suggesting that OIRA 
often reviews rules not clearly within the scope of the Executive Order’s coverage). 
 53. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,737 (Oct. 4, 1993) (detailing 
analysis requirements). 
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expansions of OIRA’s scope have occurred while OIRA’s staff 
has declined—from over 80 in the 1980s to under 50 today.54 
Recent statements regarding the functions and effect of OIRA 
review have conflicted, sometimes sharply.55 Public infor-
mation is incomplete regarding the influence of centralized 
regulatory review on key outcomes, such as consistency with 
presidential priorities, quality of analysis, and net benefits.56 
Information regarding how OIRA review has specifically af-
fected particular rules has rarely been disclosed either by OIRA 
or by the agencies whose rules are reviewed, notwithstanding 
the disclosure requirements in Executive Order 12,866.57 When 
information related to OIRA review is disclosed, it is typically 
difficult to locate.58 OIRA’s posting of forty-two review and re-
turn letters in the George W. Bush administration, under OIRA 
Administrator John Graham, represents a notable exception.59 
With the exception of the return of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’s (EPA’s) new national ambient air quality stand-
ard for ozone in the fall of 2011 (a return that Administrator 
Cass Sunstein stated was directed by the President himself), no 
other return letters have been posted during the Obama admin-
istration,60 and only one review letter has been posted since 
                                                                                                                               
 54. See Katzen Testimony, supra note 6, at 41. 
 55. Compare, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 29 (arguing that OIRA does not systemat-
ically review economically significant rules, but rather rules “of special interest to 
OIRA staffers”), with Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1840 (portraying OIRA as an effi-
cient center for “inter-agency coordination” and information aggregation). 
 56. For one attempt, see Robert W. Hahn, An Evaluation of Government Efforts to Im-
prove Regulatory Decision Making, 3 INT’L REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 245 (2009). 
 57. Heinzerling, supra note 29 (“OIRA follows, and allows the agencies to follow, 
almost none of the disclosure requirements of EO 12,866.”); see also Nina A. Mendel-
son, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
1127, 1149–56 (2010). 
 58. Professor Wendy Wagner has reported on the difficulty of locating infor-
mation on regulations.gov regarding changes made to rules undergoing regulatory 
review. After extensive searching on regulations.gov, she was able to locate a num-
ber of “redline” versions of rules, but could not distinguish which redlined changes 
were added by OIRA and which by the agency. WENDY WAGNER, SCIENCE IN REGU-
LATION: A STUDY OF AGENCY DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES 139–43 (2013), available 
at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_ 
Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0oGHL27ocDP]. 
 59. Mendelson, supra note 57, at 1150. 
 60. See Return Letters, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoReturnLetters, [http://perma.cc/0wtCsmJ2Xw1]. 
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2008.61 For example, the recent withdrawal of an Agriculture 
Department rule limiting the use of synthetic additives in foods 
labeled “organic” was unaccompanied by any public explana-
tion on the OIRA website or on the website of the federal gov-
ernment’s regulatory database, www.regulations.gov.62 
Following his departure from government, former OIRA 
Administrator Professor Cass Sunstein has described OIRA’s 
function as largely “an information aggregator,” using regula-
tory review to focus on issues of quality of analysis, interagen-
cy coordination, and avoidance of “serious problem[s] or mis-
take[s].”63 But Sunstein also has championed the function of 
regulatory review in implementing presidential priorities, re-
marking that Obama’s Executive Order 13,563 serves as a “kind 
of mini-constitution for the regulatory state.”64 
II. AGENCY AVOIDANCE 
In recent years, some observers have suggested that agencies 
may use a variety of tactics to avoid OIRA review. By formally 
stating that OIRA would also review (or was already review-
ing) guidance documents, for example, executive branch offi-
cials have implicitly confirmed some of these concerns.65 
In this Part, we offer a critical appraisal of the incentives of 
agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA review, and a broader 
typology than we have seen in prior literature of avoidance tac-
tics. As mentioned above, a full typology of avoidance tactics is 
important to evaluate which response options would remedy 
which types of avoidance, to anticipate the potential shifts from 
                                                                                                                               
 61. See Review Letters, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/postReviewLetters.jsp, 
[http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0tPdjtMvT2w]. 
 62. See National Organic Program: Sunset Review for Nutrient Vitamins and Minerals, 
OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=0581-
AD17, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0zYTGuyjgUy] (stating only that withdrawal 
of rule would preserve status quo until a final rule could be issued). 
 63. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1840, 1842. This mistake-avoidance rationale reflects 
Sunstein’s view in Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000). 
 64. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1846; see also Heinzerling, supra note 29 (suggesting 
that OIRA, rather than the agencies, “was calling the shots”). 
 65. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007); Memorandum 
from Peter Orszag, supra note 44. 
464 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 37 
 
one avoidance tactic to another that strategic agencies might 
pursue in reaction to possible response measures, and to assess 
the likelihood of different avoidance tactics in a repeat-player 
setting. An assessment of a response measure will depend on 
both the avoidance tactic to be regulated and the alternative tac-
tics that the response measure might then induce. 
A. Prior Literature 
The prior literature in this area has made important strides in 
identifying a range of methods agencies might use to avoid OI-
RA review and in assessing the motivations that might prompt 
agencies to avoid (or agree to) regulatory review. The literature, 
however, remains incomplete. As we explain below, some po-
tential avoidance methods, such as litigation settlements, de-
serve more in-depth consideration. Moreover, the literature does 
not yet fully attend to an important feature of OIRA-agency in-
teractions—the dynamic strategic relationship between OIRA 
and the agencies. That OIRA and the agencies interact again and 
again, year after year, in a “repeat game,” can change agency 
calculations regarding the costs and benefits to the agency of 
avoidance tactics. In such a repeat relationship, agencies can an-
ticipate the prospect of OIRA monitoring, detection, and sanc-
tions—recognizing that OIRA detection may vary across types 
of avoidance tactics—perhaps followed by agency countermoves 
and further response measures by OIRA or others. Similarly, the 
repeat relationship can influence OIRA’s calculations and choic-
es. The joint result may be to foster more cooperation, or it may 
shift agency avoidance efforts to other tactics. 
The most important entry in the recent literature on avoid-
ance may be from Professor Jennifer Nou, who argues in an 
extensive 2013 article that an agency might “self-insulate” 
against OIRA review if the review is costly or irksome to the 
agency or if the agency’s preferences diverge from those of OI-
RA (or, implicitly, the President).66 “Self-insulation,” she fur-
ther argues, would depend on the agency’s resource con-
straints and the likelihood of what she calls “reversal” at the 
                                                                                                                               
 66. E.g., Nou, supra note 3, at 1761 (“The incentive to engage in strategic behav-
ior . . . increases the more an agency expects the President to disagree with [it.]”). 
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hands of OIRA.67 OIRA’s potential responses in regulatory re-
view clearly extend not only to reversal—including issuing a 
return letter or requesting an agency to withdraw a rule alto-
gether—but also to modifications that change the focus, scope, 
approach, policy instrument, or stringency of an agency rule. 
Nou examines a particular set of tactics for avoiding OIRA 
review, including using guidance documents and policy mem-
oranda, using adjudication, splitting rules into smaller pieces, 
making review difficult by presenting a poorly-explained CBA, 
waiting to submit a rule to OIRA until just before a statutory or 
judicial deadline, and building coalitions among other agencies 
and offices.68 We offer a more complete typology below, adding 
tactics Nou does not discuss, such as enforcement actions, liti-
gation settlements, and delegation or deference to standards 
developed by other governmental entities and institutions—for 
example, states or private standards organizations. 
Nou details steps Congress could take to increase or decrease 
agency insulation. She also suggests that courts might attempt 
to detect an agency’s efforts to insulate its actions from OIRA 
review, though she acknowledges the difficulty courts may 
face in discerning precisely what such self-insulation might 
signify.69 But Nou does not recommend specific response op-
tions, nor does she recommend (as we do) that OIRA and other 
actors undertake a systematic comparative assessment of a 
range of alternative response options. 
Nou looks at the agencies, OIRA, and other entities as strate-
gic actors, guided by their preferences and the expected bene-
fits (or costs) of their actions, and subject to resource con-
straints.70 She acknowledges that repeat games are a 
possibility,71 stating that repeat play may prompt agencies only 
to self-insulate when doing so is “most valuable to them,” but 
her analysis does not consider how the possibility (or absence) 
of repeat play might affect an agency’s tendency to use particu-
lar avoidance methods. Here, we consider more fully the likeli-
                                                                                                                               
 67. Id. at 1803. 
 68. Id. at 1782–1802. 
 69. Id. at 1823–30. 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 1756–57 (conceptualizing involved entities as strategic actors); id. 
at 1814–15 (referring to resource constraints). 
 71. Id. at 1771 (stating that agencies are “repeat players”). 
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hood and implications of repeat games among the affected in-
stitutions, highlighting differences in the ease of detecting 
avoidance tactics. For example, as we discuss below, the possi-
bility of repeat play with OIRA is likely to deter an agency 
from the so-called “splitting” of economically significant rules 
or the use of non-rule guidance or policy statements (each of 
which may be relatively easy for OIRA to detect over time); 72 
but this possibility may have less deterrent effect in other set-
tings where repeat play with OIRA is atypical (and OIRA’s cost 
of detection and countermoves may be higher), such as an 
agency’s modification of enforcement approaches or its entry 
into a consent decree. 
Systematic empirical evidence on the frequency and patterns 
of avoidance is limited. Alex Acs and Charles Cameron have 
attempted to assess whether OIRA review has reduced the his-
torical rate of rulemakings at key agencies by assessing the rate 
of publication of Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRMs).73 
Examining data on twenty-five federal agencies, they found no 
reduction in the rate of NPRM production for economically 
significant rules even for agencies with high rates of “audit” by 
OIRA, suggesting that the increased cost or ossification of 
rulemaking from OIRA review is not a great concern for agen-
cies, and that there is a lack of clear-cut evidence of avoidance 
of OIRA.74 Among these same agencies, they also found no da-
ta to suggest that agencies “split” economically significant 
rules (exceeding the $100 million impact threshold) into small-
er parts, each below that threshold, to avoid OIRA review.75 
They found no significant change in the production of econom-
ically significant rules when OIRA audit rates increased, 
though they did, oddly, still find an increase in the production 
of rules that did not reach the level of economic significance. 
As Acs and Cameron themselves recognize, however, such da-
ta are at best a “coarse metric,”76 and a far more nuanced as-
sessment is necessary to truly evaluate agency use of avoidance 
tactics and agency incentives when facing OIRA review. For 
                                                                                                                               
 72. See id. at 1792. 
 73. Acs & Cameron, supra note 10, at 23–24. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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example, because of the lack of data, Acs and Cameron do not 
assess whether agencies might try strategically to avoid review 
of particular rules, 77 including when the agency expects OIRA 
disagreement on the merits.78 
Similarly, Connor Raso has found little evidence that guid-
ance documents are used by agencies to avoid notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures; he concludes that the con-
cern over agency avoidance using guidance documents has 
been “overstated,” and amounts to an “overgeneralization 
from a few egregious examples.”79 Meanwhile, Raso has also 
found that agencies may try to avoid statutory analytic re-
quirements subject to judicial review, at least where the risk of 
detection and sanctions for such avoidance is low (for example, 
because the statute allows the agency to opt out of the analysis 
                                                                                                                               
 77. Id. 
 78. Before the Acs and Cameron paper, a student note in the Harvard Law Review 
attempted to assess empirically one potential avoidance method—whether agencies 
might understate the estimated costs of rules in an effort to avoid a designation of 
“economically significant,” which would trigger an enhanced level of review at 
OIRA and an agency obligation to prepare a cost-benefit analysis. OIRA Avoidance, 
supra note 3. The author looked only at whether economically significant rules sub-
jected to OIRA review had been initially designated as such in the first Unified 
Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions in which the rule was “published,” 
most likely sometime earlier than the issuance of the Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing. Id. at 1007–08. Using this method, the author did locate some rules (ranging 
from 18% to 30% at three agencies) that were initially designated as not economical-
ly significant in a Unified Agenda, but that were ultimately deemed by OIRA to be 
economically significant. Id. at 1009–11. But this method may overstate the estimate 
of avoidance, because the Unified Agenda is known to be a preliminary document, 
including regulatory proposals that are not yet projected to result in a Notice of 
Proposed Rule in any particular timeframe. See, e.g., Flight Crewmember Duty Limi-
tations and Rest Requirements 73 Fed. Reg. 71,417 (Nov. 24, 2008) (listing, under 
timetable for rule to prescribe flight crewmember duty limitation and rest require-
ments, “Next Action Undetermined,” but still identifying rule as “significant”); see 
also Katzen Testimony, supra note 6, at 40 (Unified Agenda is “more of a “paper 
exercise than an analytical tool.”). And indeed, the author also located some rules 
(albeit a lower percentage) that were initially designated by the agency as economi-
cally significant but that later were deemed not economically significant in OIRA 
review. OIRA Avoidance, supra note 3, at 1010. Likely for lack of data, the author did 
not look at whether the agency asserted economic insignificance at the time the rule 
was submitted to OIRA, which would be the key question for purposes of assessing 
potential avoidance. The use of first mention of a rule in the Unified Agenda seems 
a weak proxy for this strategy. 
 79. Raso, Strategic or Sincere?, supra note 10, at 821. 
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for a wide range of reasons), as under the Regulatory Flexibil-
ity Act and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.80 
An interesting hypothesis (yet to be tested with empirical data) 
is offered by Professor Michael Livermore, who argues that White 
House regulatory review using CBA, rather than constraining 
agencies’ policy autonomy, may enhance agencies’ autonomy 
from the White House, because agencies themselves help develop 
the CBA methodology, and thus agencies with greater expertise 
in CBA methodologies (such as EPA) are more able to influence 
the terms of methodological discourse or debates with OIRA in 
the direction the agency favors.81 His examples could also be un-
derstood, though, to reveal a useful ongoing dialogue between 
OIRA and the agencies as they jointly develop better practices for 
cost-benefit analysis; each learns from the other. Livermore also 
argues that agencies might use CBAs to help persuade outsiders 
that a rule is worth issuing, thus helping to insulate the rule from 
external political winds, at the same time that outsiders (such as 
academic economists) can also shape the agency-OIRA discourse 
over CBA methodologies.82 
B. Incentives and Strategic Behavior by Agencies and OIRA 
We now turn to an effort to analyze more thoroughly agen-
cies’ methods of avoiding OIRA review.83 We begin by analyz-
ing the incentives that would motivate an agency to avoid or 
cooperate with OIRA, and then we develop a more complete 
typology of avoidance tactics. 
                                                                                                                               
 80. Raso, Agency Avoidance, supra note 10. 
 81. Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2–3), available at http://policyintegrity.org/ 
publications/detail/cost-benefit-analysis-and-agency-independence/. 
 82. Id.; see also Nou, supra note 3, at 1802 (agencies may try to recruit allies to raise 
OIRA’s costs of review). 
 83. We do not discuss here possible agency avoidance of APA notice-and-
comment requirements or judicial review. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-13-21, AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC 
COMMENTS (2012). Also, we do not address here review under the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act or the Small Business Administration review, 
nor do we address the Congressional Review Act. 
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1. Presidential and OIRA Incentives to  
Require Review of Agency Action 
A President with a policy agenda, not surprisingly, will be in-
terested in controlling the regulatory apparatus of the executive 
branch. Regulatory action—quasi-legislative action—can be 
broadly applicable, legally binding, and long-lasting. Presiden-
tial control over the regulatory state is thus a potentially highly 
effective mechanism for achieving presidential priorities and 
distributing the benefits and burdens of government, and Presi-
dents tend to be held politically accountable for the costs and 
benefits of regulation (even if that regulation is driven by legisla-
tion enacted by Congress). High regulatory costs, low regulatory 
benefits, or perceptions that those costs or benefits are unfairly 
distributed may undermine the President’s political support. 
Agencies’ failure to carry out the President’s policy agenda, or 
agency adoption of policies that conflict with the President’s 
agenda, may likewise undermine the President’s political sup-
port. These problems may also tarnish the President’s longer-
term legacy of accomplishment. Thus, every President of both 
parties for at least the last four decades has sought systematic 
and centralized oversight of the regulatory state. 
On occasion, however, a President may wish publicly to dis-
tance himself from a particular agency action and hence may 
acquiesce in agency avoidance of review.84 Alternatively, the 
White House may sometimes want to offer relaxed review to 
an agency on one issue, as a bargaining chip to secure a deal 
with that agency on other issues.85 
As discussed above, OIRA regulatory review is now a well-
established device for Presidential authority over executive-
branch agencies—one of several tools that the President can 
use to increase the chances that agency choices will conform to 
presidential preferences.86 So, as with any process that provides 
                                                                                                                               
 84. See Mendelson, supra note 57, at 1161–62. 
 85. Nou, supra note 3, at 1815. 
 86. See Kagan, supra note 32 (discussing regulatory review and other mechanisms 
for Presidential supervision of regulatory agencies). In addition, Presidential ap-
pointment of the agency head may be another such supervisory tool, but it may be 
ineffective with respect to specific policies if the agency head, once confirmed in 
office, has incentives to diverge from presidential preferences in order to serve other 
constituencies, and the President faces either legal or political obstacles to guiding or 
 
470 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 37 
 
for the review and approval of an agent’s actions or that asks 
the agent for a reasoned explanation of its decisions, OIRA’s 
review of agency regulations might be understood as a means 
of increasing the chances that the actions of the agent—the 
agency—hew more closely to the preferences of the principal—
the President. And those preferences, of course, might extend 
both to the general processes of regulatory decisionmaking—
the sorts of information agencies consider and prioritize and 
the quality of their analysis—and to particular policies.87 
                                                                                                                               
removing the agency head. Another tool of presidential oversight is control over the 
agency’s budget; it is unclear how often the budget side of OMB acts to assist the 
regulatory side of OMB and OIRA. 
 87. Some have criticized OIRA review on the grounds that the “principal” 
whose interest may be furthered by OIRA review may, in practice, actually be 
civil servants in OIRA, or a political official outside the regulatory agency, or in-
dustry (rather than the President, Congress, or the people). To the extent that 
these others’ policy preferences are displacing or superseding the preferences of 
the President, Congress, and the Senate-confirmed presidential appointees who 
have the authority delegated by Congress to administer particular programs, the 
oversight process can appear to be less democratically responsive, undermining 
the intent of Congress (or even that of the President, if the preferences communi-
cated through OIRA review do not match the President’s). See, e.g., Nicholas Bag-
ley & Richard Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1260, 1303 (2006); Heinzerling, supra note 29. 
 Indeed, some have argued that congressional delegations to a particular executive 
branch agency official should be understood to mean that the rulemaking agency 
alone—without interference by even the President—is to make key decisions in 
implementing the statutory program. The requirement of OIRA “clearance” for 
regulatory review would seem to be in some tension with this notion. Others argue 
that all congressional delegations to executive agencies should be understood to 
mean delegations to the President. E.g., Kagan, supra note 32, at 2288–90. Nonethe-
less, the longstanding existence and potential usefulness of both OIRA review and 
interagency coordination on regulatory matters, together with consensus across 
presidencies regarding the value of such review (and the fact that the OIRA admin-
istrator is also a presidential appointee with Senate confirmation), tend to support 
the idea that agencies should participate in such review, or at least are not precluded 
from taking account of views from many quarters – including OIRA – in their exer-
cise of delegated rulemaking authority. 
 Even though agencies would seem to be able to consider presidential views and 
perhaps even to treat them as dispositive, there is debate over whether the agency’s 
“true” principal is the President, or alternatively the Congress, or both, as represent-
atives of the people. A rulemaking agency’s authority is, of course, defined by stat-
utes enacted by Congress and presented to the President for signature (unless enact-
ed over a President’s veto). The agency’s principals accordingly might be 
understood to encompass both the current President, as chief executive, and the 
Congress (and President) who enacted the original statutory delegation. And all 
these institutions might be understood as agents of the people as principal, who are 
represented by their current elected officials in Congress and in the Presidency.  
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2. Incentives for Agencies to Cooperate with OIRA Review 
An agency might favor undergoing OIRA review, in general 
or at least with regard to a particular rule, because of the pro-
spect that the review, through technical expertise and the inter-
agency process, could contribute useful information and im-
prove the quality of the agency’s analyses and policy outcomes. 
Relatedly, agencies might view OIRA review as contributing 
useful input on presidential and public values, because of OI-
RA’s proximity to the President (and the OIRA Administrator 
having been appointed by the President).88 OIRA review might 
also increase the likelihood of the agency’s successfully promul-
gating a particular rule, as where the review convinces OIRA to 
become an ally of the rule, or where the review convinces other 
parties, whether inside or outside the government, to become 
allies of the rule.89 Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) using 
CBA might even strengthen the targets and policy instruments 
in the rule.90 In addition, OIRA review could improve the likeli-
hood that the rule will survive judicial review, possibly because 
it represents a presidential imprimatur or because it represents 
approval by technical experts that the agency’s analysis and rea-
soning are of higher quality and arguably non-arbitrary. Nou 
suggests that, as one way to increase compliance with OIRA, 
                                                                                                                               
 To that extent, regulatory review performed by OIRA might be understood not 
purely as increasing the agency’s responsiveness to the President, but as increasing 
the agency’s relative responsiveness to the President as compared to its responsive-
ness to other principals. Such presidential oversight through OIRA may in turn 
accord with increasing the agency’s responsiveness to the people as a whole – to 
“maximize net benefits to society,” and moreover because the President is constitu-
tionally charged with executing the laws, and the President is elected nationally, 
whereas members of Congress are elected in local districts. 
 88. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 877, 904 (2010). But see Bagley & Revesz, supra note 87, at 1307 
(“OIRA is not the President”). 
 89. Examples include the decisions to phase down lead in gasoline and to phase 
out CFCs that deplete stratospheric ozone during the Reagan administration, both 
based in part on CBAs. See also Nou, supra note 3, at 1818 (citing an example from 
the Clinton administration in which OIRA review helped FDA design a better policy 
instrument for seafood safety). 
 90. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Envi-
ronmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with the New York 
University Law Review) (reporting that EPA’s RIAs using CBA turned out to war-
rant even more stringent ambient air quality standards for several major air pollu-
tants than EPA had set under Clean Air Act section 109 absent CBA). 
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courts could take a harder look at rules that avoid OIRA;91 we 
discuss judicial review responses below in Part III. 
Broader institutional considerations, beyond the specific rule at 
issue, might also encourage agencies to cooperate with OIRA re-
view. These might include the ongoing relationship of the agency 
to OIRA over time, and the relationships of individual agency of-
ficials to the President. Agencies may also simply respect the insti-
tutional value of oversight by the elected chief executive. 
3. Incentives for Agencies to Avoid OIRA 
On the other hand, an agency may resist OIRA review, in gen-
eral or for a particular rule, for a number of reasons. Agencies 
may be irked by oversight that they perceive as intruding into 
their decision processes. Agencies may also have concerns about 
cost and delay due to OIRA review, about the considerations 
that OIRA review may incorporate, and about the substantive 
elements that OIRA may seek to put in the rule.92 Senior officials 
at agencies (appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate and exercising authority delegated by Congress) may dis-
like having their policy initiatives reviewed by career civil serv-
ants at OIRA (although the OIRA Administrator is also appoint-
ed by the President and confirmed by the Senate). 
The review process itself demands time and resources. OIRA 
review could result in significant delays before a rule is is-
sued;93 it also sometimes results in the rule’s outright with-
drawal, rather than the agency’s presumably preferred out-
come of issuance. Further, rules are often changed during 
OIRA review; an agency might resist OIRA review if it per-
ceives that anticipated modifications are not likely to improve 
the rule. Modifications, delays, or withdrawal might generally 
make the rule worse, in the agency’s view, if the agency be-
                                                                                                                               
 91. Nou, supra note 3, at 1824. 
 92. Observing an agency choosing to employ a nonrulemaking policy form (for 
example, a guidance document or adjudication) does not necessarily mean that a 
desire to avoid OIRA review induced that choice. For example, if the prospect of 
judicial review had already induced the agency to shift to nonrulemaking policy 
forms, then OIRA review may thereby also be avoided even if the agency would 
have welcomed OIRA review. In short, each type of review (executive and judicial) 
may be a confounding variable for studies of the effect of the other kind of review 
on agency avoidance. 
 93. See, e.g., Editorial, Stuck in Purgatory, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A22. 
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lieves its understanding and treatment of the technical or ana-
lytical issues is superior to what OIRA can contribute. An 
agency might also see modifications as making the rule worse 
if the agency views its rule as best implementing the policy 
commitments of the underlying statute, or embodying better 
insights into current public views, perhaps gained through the 
public comment process, than OIRA is likely to possess.94 
4. Dislike of Perceived Institutional Intrusion on Agency 
Policymaking 
At a broad level, agencies might view their responsibility to 
implement statutes as primary, by virtue of both statutory del-
egation to the agency and institutional expertise developed in 
the agency. They might resist OIRA review if they view their 
authority and technical expertise as superior to that of OIRA. 
They might worry that OIRA review will import the views of 
opponents of the rule (such as regulated industries) who will 
have OIRA’s ear.  
Or an agency might see the statute and its implementing pol-
icies as a vehicle to deliver rents to the agency’s constituencies, 
such as industries or advocacy groups. If so, the agency might 
resist review to the extent that OIRA review would impede the 
agency’s delivery of rents to special interests by insisting that 
the agency pursue broader measures of social well-being (e.g., 
to “maximize social net benefits”).95 
Agency views on the President’s legal authority and the le-
gitimacy of OIRA review both may be relevant to whether the 
agency seeks to avoid that review. As the chief executive, the 
President can both appoint and remove senior agency officials; 
this authority in general, and the specific fear of removal, may 
inspire a degree of loyalty, at least among the President’s own 
appointees (though “capture” of an appointee by his or her 
                                                                                                                               
 94. Cf. Katharine Q. Seelye, Ideas & Trends; Flooded with Comments, Officials Plug 
Their Ears, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at C4. 
 95. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 87, at 1284–85. Similarly, Joseph Stiglitz has 
praised such analysis because it vindicates the “national interest” over special inter-
est politics, through “quantitative assessment of the impacts on various groups, a 
process that often results in outcomes different from the aggregation of political 
interests that emerges from the policy process.” Joseph Stiglitz, Looking Out for the 
National Interest: The Principles of the Council of Economic Advisers, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 
PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 109, 111 (May 1997). 
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agency is regularly lamented in Washington). The President’s 
threat of removal might be moderated somewhat, however, if 
an agency official anticipates that he or she possesses some lev-
erage vis-à-vis the President—to the extent that there would be 
negative news media coverage and a general perception that 
presidential removal of an agency official over a rulemaking 
issue may be an “alarm signal to the public that the presi-
dent may not be acting . . . in the best interest of the country.”96 
In addition, there is an ongoing debate on the scope of the 
President’s constitutional and statutory authority—when the 
statute delegates rulemaking power to the agency official—to 
direct particular agency actions.97 Proponents of the unitary ex-
ecutive theory might argue, for example, that because the Presi-
dent serves as the chief executive by virtue of the Constitution, 
Congress is prohibited from insulating executive institutions 
from presidential control, including the authority to direct par-
ticular actions. But this view has not yet found full favor in the 
courts, which have sustained at least some restrictions on presi-
dential control over agencies.98 On the statutory question, com-
mentators have debated whether Congress’s assignment of 
rulemaking authority to a “Secretary” or “Administrator” rather 
than to the President might be understood to limit the Presi-
dent’s authority to direct a particular rulemaking result.99 On the 
other hand, perhaps a delegation to the President refers only to 
Congress’s intent that the President, rather than Congress, as-
sign the responsible agency to perform a particular rulemaking 
                                                                                                                               
 96. Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-
So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 1004 (2001). 
 97. That debate is beyond the scope of this Article. Regarding the unitary-
executive argument under the Constitution, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 
549–50 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administra-
tion, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1994). 
 98. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138 (2010) (vacating one, but not both, layers of for-cause removal restrictions 
because of undue encroachment on presidential control); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 99. See COPELAND, supra note 48, at 20; Percival, supra note 96, at 1008; Kevin M. 
Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 
293–96 (2006); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Adminis-
trative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702–03 (2007); Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 
328 (noting that the OLC memo accompanying Executive Order 12,291 concluded 
that the President could advise, but not determine, the content of an agency action). 
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task, especially because such statutes are enacted against the 
backdrop of presidential removal authority and, more recently, 
regulatory review procedures.100 An agency official who believes 
that he or she, rather than the President, possesses the statutory 
authority to make the final decision, might seek to avoid OIRA 
review as a means of avoiding conflict over that decision or that 
authority.101 Moreover, agency officials, as noted, may view the 
OIRA process as (mainly) career civil servants in OIRA oversee-
ing the work of Senate-confirmed senior agency officials. Even if 
the President is understood to possess strong supervisory or di-
rective authority (given that the OIRA administrator is a presi-
dential appointee whom the Senate confirmed), this attitude 
may reduce the perceived legitimacy of OIRA review and 
prompt greater resistance.102 
Thus, agencies may prefer autonomy to implement their own 
policies and priorities and may resist being guided by OIRA 
and the President as an institutional matter, irrespective of dis-
agreement or agreement on policy objectives and outcomes. 
Over 90% of rules classified as economically significant and 
over 70% of all rules are changed sometime during OIRA re-
view.103 These numbers have been fairly stable since the early 
2000s.104 Although it is impossible to tell definitively without 
greater disclosure than we now have, it appears that rule 
changes are typically introduced by the OIRA process itself, 
rather than by some other factor, such as a change initiated by 
the rulemaking agency.105 The numbers may understate chang-
es prompted by OIRA, as they do not include changes made or 
                                                                                                                               
 100. See Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority Over 
Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2458 (2011); Kagan, supra note 32, at 2327–28. 
 101. Commentators have also suggested that the agency official might have more 
backbone in OIRA review. See Percival, supra note 96, at 1009; Strauss, supra note 99. 
 102. See Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 33 (OIRA review conveys the views of 
“OIRA career staff and other agencies’ career staff and other Cabinet officials . . .”, 
etc.—not the President.); Lisa Heinzerling, Who Is Running OIRA?, REGBLOG (Apr. 
29, 2013), https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2013/04/29-heinzerling-oira-
review.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0gRFyz5TkLj]. 
 103. Mendelson, supra note 57, at 1151 n.125. 
 104. Mendelson, supra note 57, at 1151. 
 105. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1847 (“The vast majority of rules . . . are generally 
changed (and improved) as a result [of the OIRA review process].”). 
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options developed when agencies share early drafts of rules 
with OIRA before entering the formal review process.106 
5. Dislike of Changes or Delays in Regulatory Outcomes 
An agency may fear that OIRA review will change outcomes 
in ways the agency dislikes, such as by preventing or delaying 
regulations that would protect the public health, safety, securi-
ty, well-being, or the environment. An agency might view OI-
RA’s preferences as diverging significantly from the agency’s 
policy preferences as to goals or means. For example, an agen-
cy and OIRA might be at odds regarding how a statute should 
best be implemented, even if they generally agree on the goal 
to be attained. Moreover, the agency may believe it has a better 
understanding of technical questions, public values, or political 
issues than OIRA does. An agency and OIRA also might be at 
odds regarding whether a particular interest should be protect-
ed in statutory implementation, or how aggressively to pursue 
a statute’s goal at the expense of other important considera-
tions.107 OIRA review might restrict an agency’s slack to pursue 
goals that diverge from the preferences of the White House or 
OIRA. If OIRA review comes only at the end of an agency’s 
multiyear policy-development effort, then negative reviews by 
OIRA seemingly at the last minute may feel especially jarring 
to the agency and to regulatory beneficiaries. 
For example, Professor Lisa Heinzerling, formerly a senior 
policy official at the EPA during the Obama administration, 
has argued that OIRA review has effectively blocked important 
rules without adequate substantive justification, resulting in 
significant lost regulatory benefits and wasted agency re-
sources.108 Heinzerling also recently criticized OIRA review as 
                                                                                                                               
 106. Wagner, supra note 58, at 82–83 (noting that OIRA interprets disclosure pro-
visions not to apply to pre-review changes or to changes prompted by staff rather 
than branch chiefs at OIRA); Heinzerling, supra note 29 (describing early review 
practices); see also John D. Graham, The Evolving Regulatory Role of the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 171, 186 (2007) (reporting 
several cases of proactive early involvement by OIRA with agencies, such as helping 
to prompt and shape rules that required trans-fat content in food labels, reduced 
diesel-engine pollution, and increased automobile-fuel efficiency). 
 107. See generally Bagley & Revesz, supra note 87. 
 108. Heinzerling, supra note 29; see also Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Central-
ized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 214–15 (2012). 
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opaque, lacking in accountability for its results, and requiring 
changes in rules that are largely driven by OIRA itself, rather 
than by the results of interagency processes.109 The concern that 
OIRA review may be exceeding its ninety-day schedule and 
thereby delaying needed agency regulations was highlighted 
as President Obama began his second term and appointed a 
new OIRA administrator.110 
In contrast, former OIRA administrators have praised OIRA 
review for improving regulatory outcomes. Cass Sunstein 
states that rules are generally “changed (and improved) as a 
result” of OIRA review.111 John Graham and Sally Katzen also 
report favorably on OIRA’s role in not only reducing regulato-
ry costs but also increasing regulatory benefits such as protec-
tion of public health, safety, and the environment.112 
To explore agencies’ incentives to avoid review, we need 
empirical studies to assess the effects of regulatory review on 
regulatory outcomes—both in fact and as perceived by agen-
cies. The key challenges here are to estimate and evaluate those 
regulatory outcomes, and to compare them to a counterfactual 
baseline—what would have happened absent regulatory re-
view.113 Jennifer Nou has suggested that the regulatory review 
process generally prompts agencies to perform higher-quality 
analyses and permits them to obtain “greater information and 
expertise from other executive branch entities.”114 Steven 
Croley has argued that OIRA review can have a discernible 
                                                                                                                               
 109. Heinzerling, supra note 29. 
 110. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Pollution Rules Delayed As White House Slows The 
Process of Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2013, at A19; Editorial, Stuck in Purgatory, 
supra note 93, at A22; see also James Goodwin, Transparency Withdrawn: A New Tactic 
for Shielding OIRA’s Regulatory Review Activities, CPRBLOG (Sept. 18, 2013), 
www.progressivereform.org, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0Azg4g7uwvt] (sug-
gesting that OIRA is asking agencies to withdraw long-pending rules, possibly to 
improve statistics on delay of review). 
 111. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1847. 
 112. See Katzen Testimony, supra note 6, at 36–38; John D. Graham, Saving Lives 
through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 461–62 (2008); Gra-
ham, supra note 106, at 172. 
 113. See Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1111, 1113; Derek Gill, Applying the Logic of Regulatory Management to Regulatory 
Management in New Zealand, in RECALIBRATING BEHAVIOUR: SMARTER REGULATION 
IN A GLOBAL WORLD 559, 577–78 (Susy Frankel & Deborah Ryder eds., 2013). 
 114. Nou, supra note 3, at 1811. 
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and beneficial influence on agency rules.115 Alex Acs and 
Charles Cameron studied twenty-five agencies over the 1995–
2010 period and found no evidence that OIRA review had 
chilled the baseline rate of agency rulemaking activity.116 Even 
so, agency perceptions of OIRA review might motivate avoid-
ance of review in specific cases. 
6. Agency-Oversight Relations as a Repeated Game 
An evaluation of agency avoidance and oversight response 
cannot be limited to the question of initial incentives, because 
the parties interact with each other repeatedly over time and 
across issues. Scholars have modeled agency behavior in the face 
of review as a strategic game.117 For example, Tiller and Spiller 
suggest that if the agency has a choice among policymaking in-
struments—for example, inaction, rulemaking, or adjudication—
with different costs and payoffs, the agency will choose the in-
strument that maximizes its own net benefits.118 They observe 
                                                                                                                               
 115. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investiga-
tion, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 883 (2003) (finding relatively little bias in OIRA review). 
 116. Acs & Cameron, supra note 10, at 3–4. 
 117. Several papers have examined agency strategy. See Ethan Bueno de Mes-
quita & Matthew C. Stephenson, Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight, 101 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 607 (2007); James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, 
Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal 
vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 
112 (1994); David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethink-
ing the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 407 (1997); Emer-
son H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political 
Games in Administrative Law, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 350 (1999); see also Acs & 
Cameron, supra note 10, at 4-5 (arguing that models of judicial review are similar-
ly applicable to presidential review through OIRA); Matthew D. Adler, The Posi-
tive Political Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Comment on Johnston, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1429, 1431 (2002) (discussing and critiquing Johnston’s model); Jason Scott 
Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1354 (2002) (arguing that requiring CBA 
can lead to decreased regulation when firms can lobby and litigate in ways that 
raise the costs to agencies of regulating); Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environ-
ment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 238 (1994) (applying game theory to presidential 
oversight of agency rulemaking, focusing on the influence of interest groups on 
OMB oversight and calling for greater transparency); Eric A. Posner, Controlling 
Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1137, 1143 (2001) (arguing that in a dynamic game, CBA can lead to in-
creased regulation and decreased influence by interest groups). 
 118. Tiller & Spiller, supra note 117, at 352. 
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that judicial review can change the agency’s strategy, because it 
poses a risk of reversing the agency’s policy.119 The costs to the 
reviewer, and hence the likelihood of reversing the agency, also 
vary across the different instruments.120 Thus, in some cases, the 
agency may choose an instrument that would have offered low-
er net benefits (to the agency) in the absence of review, if that 
option poses higher costs to the reviewer and hence reduces the 
risk of reversal sufficiently to raise the agency’s net expected 
benefit for that instrument above those of other instruments.121 
Tiller and Spiller use this reasoning to argue that agencies may 
shift from rulemaking to adjudication if courts find it more cost-
ly to review a series of adjudications than to review a rule of 
comparable scope.122 
Similarly, agencies that would have preferred rulemaking, 
absent OIRA review, may, when subject to OIRA review of 
such rulemaking, shift to alternative approaches if the costs to 
OIRA of reviewing that alternative approach are sufficiently 
high, so that the switch would reduce the likelihood of OIRA 
reversing the agency’s decision.123  
This kind of analysis, however, should be extended to con-
sider OIRA’s next move in a repeat-player extended game. 
Given OIRA’s well-established, long-term relationship with the 
regulatory agencies, the prospect of countermoves by OIRA is 
likely to be more significant than in the judicial-review settings 
that Tiller and Spiller analyzed.124 
Meanwhile, we might assume that OIRA would choose the 
oversight approach that maximizes its net benefits, which in 
turn depends on the costs to OIRA and the costs to the agency. If 
it can expand its oversight scope to encompass the agency’s 
avoidance tactic, or impose costs on the agency for its avoidance, 
OIRA may do so where such moves increase its net benefits. 
Where OIRA and the agency already regularly interact, OIRA 
                                                                                                                               
 119. Id. at 354. 
 120. See id. at 355. 
 121. Id. at 356. 
 122. See id. at 361. 
 123. Acs & Cameron, supra note 10, at 6–8. 
 124. A possible exception is judicial review in the D.C. Circuit, because that court 
has such extensive jurisdiction over agency decisions that an agency may repeatedly 
encounter not only the same court, but the same judges. 
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may be able to detect the avoidance tactic and impose costs on 
the agency for it with a comparatively low expenditure of its 
own resources. Moreover, the agency may anticipate OIRA’s 
response, factoring it into the agency’s initial decision whether to 
try to avoid; thus, repeat playing may enhance cooperation.125 
If the agency anticipates that OIRA will have a difficult time 
detecting and responding to a particular kind of avoidance, 
that will lower the agency’s expected cost of avoidance and 
hence encourage the avoidance tactic. However, where the 
agency anticipates repeat play with OIRA, the prospect of OI-
RA’s detection of avoidance and the advent of low-cost oppor-
tunities for OIRA to act to deter avoidance may reduce the 
agency’s incentive to attempt it. 
For example, when an agency regularly engages with OIRA 
on rulemaking, it could expect that OIRA will easily be able to 
detect and impose costs for agency avoidance via guidance 
documents, subregulatory statements, or rules that the agency 
characterizes as not economically significant. OIRA might 
begin to require retrospective impact assessments of these 
guidance documents, statements and rules; demand more de-
tailed information submissions in future regulatory reviews of 
other rules and policies from that agency; or request memo-
randa from the agency itemizing planned guidance documents 
or subregulatory statements.126 
Such game-theoretic models of regulatory review are in-
formative, but they are also simplified and hence incomplete 
(as their authors recognize).127 They help identify hypotheses 
for some of the incentives facing agencies and reviewers, alt-
hough they do not reflect all the features of real-world deci-
sions. One important complication is that the government insti-
tutions comprise multiple actors, each of whom may have 
different incentives. Each institution is a “they,” not an “it.” For 
example, the goals of and incentives for longtime career offi-
                                                                                                                               
 125. Cf. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 125 (1984); COLIN F. 
CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 
336–37 (2003). 
 126. E.g., Heinzerling, supra note 29 (“[I]n my experience, OIRA personnel keep an 
eagle eye on EPA—on its public announcements, website, etc.—to make sure EPA 
does not sneak something past it.”). 
 127. E.g., Tiller & Spiller, supra note 117, at 370. 
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cials, whether in OIRA or in an agency, may differ from those 
of shorter-term political appointees. Agency official commit-
ments may also vary based on disciplinary training or the offi-
cial’s age cohort. While we do not attempt to assess these com-
plications in detail, we note in passing that differences between 
career and political appointees in an agency may moderate an 
incentive to avoid review, to the extent that a political appoin-
tee’s preferences are relatively more likely to track those of the 
President and her staff at OIRA. And to the extent that the ca-
reer officials in both the agencies and OIRA expect a long ten-
ure in government and decades of working together across 
multiple political administrations, the repeat play feature of the 
relationship may encourage both the agency’s and OIRA’s ca-
reer staffs to cooperate with each other. Still, both career and 
political officials at an agency may wish to avoid the resource 
and time demands of OIRA review.  
A game-theoretic framework for analyzing agency-OIRA in-
teractions also does not fully address potential sources of un-
certainty in the game, such as changes in personnel, incomplete 
information, or policy stickiness, that could affect OIRA’s abil-
ity to predict agency avoidance or an agency’s anticipation of 
response. That said, we think the framework helps conceptual-
ize avoidance and assess its extent, notably by highlighting the 
role that repeat relationships may have in fostering better mon-
itoring and increased cooperation; and it helps with evaluation 
of potential responses to agency avoidance.  
C. A Broader Typology of Potential Avoidance Tactics 
The likelihood and consequences of agency avoidance of OI-
RA review thus depend on the benefits and costs to each ac-
tor—in a repeat relationship—of review, avoidance, monitor-
ing, countermoves, and cooperation. These prospects may vary 
across different types of avoidance tactics. Here we examine a 
broader typology than in prior literature of avoidance tactics to 
assess their potential prevalence, especially in repeat relation-
ships between agencies and OIRA.  
Agencies might seek to structure rules to avoid the coverage 
of Executive Order 12,866, or to use other policymaking devices, 
ranging from agency adjudication to litigation settlements, 
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which are not subject to regulatory review.128 The agency might 
also shape the information it submits to OIRA to reduce the like-
lihood that OIRA can make meaningful changes in a rule.129 The 
prospect of avoidance has prompted frustration from some 
quarters, including from those interested in ensuring that agency 
policy is rational and meets cost-benefit standards,130 from regu-
lated entities that resent regulation through the “back door” or 
“under the radar,”131 and from Presidents and their immediate 
staff who find it difficult to manage bureaucratic actions.132 
Here, we examine several possible avoidance tactics. Some of 
these tactics seek to avoid review altogether, by escaping its 
boundaries. Agencies can accomplish this by ensuring that ac-
tions fall below the thresholds that trigger review—
understating impacts, or splitting rules into smaller pieces. Or 
agencies could try to act outside the scope of the types of agen-
cy action that trigger review, such as by shifting from rulemak-
ing to “subregulatory” guidance or policy statements; adjudica-
tion, enforcement actions, litigation and settlement; deference 
or delegation to other actors such as states, private standards, 
or international standards; or having the entire agency desig-
nated as outside OIRA review. Other avoidance tactics assume 
that the policy falls inside the boundaries and review is trig-
gered, but seek to raise the costs or shorten the time for review. 
Such tactics include obfuscating analysis; combining rules into 
larger, more complex packages; submitting just before dead-
lines; or building coalitions favoring the regulation. 
As we discuss below, when reconsidered in a repeat relation-
ship, several of the tactics that have raised the most concern in 
the literature (so far) may be less likely to be used, whereas 
several other tactics that have raised less concern (so far) may 
                                                                                                                               
 128. Other factors, such as the cost of notice-and-comment rulemaking and the 
cost and uncertainties accompanying judicial review, may also influence agency 
choices, but those issues are beyond the scope of this Article. See M. Elizabeth 
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2004). 
 129. E.g., Livermore, supra note 81 (arguing that agency expertise on CBA meth-
odologies may give the agency advantages in shaping its interactions with OIRA); 
Nou, supra note 3, at 1831–32 (arguing that agency obfuscation of CBA may raise the 
costs of review to OIRA). 
 130. Graham Testimony, supra note 3, at 27. 
 131. Funk, supra note 3, at 1028 (reporting “outrage”). 
 132. E.g., Kagan, supra note 32, at 2272. 
No. 2] Responding to Agency Avoidance 483 
 
be more likely to be used and to avoid oversight—even in a 
repeat-player relationship. 
1. Understating Impact or Splitting an “Economically Significant” 
Rule into Smaller Rules 
At first glance, it seems that an agency could avoid review by 
attempting to aim a rule below the threshold for OIRA review of 
“economically significant” rules, set in Executive Order 12,866 at 
an economic impact of less than $100 million.133 This could be 
accomplished by understating the rule’s impact or by “splitting” 
a larger rule into smaller pieces. These tactics would reduce the 
agency’s obligation to prepare the detailed analyses of costs and 
benefits required for “economically significant” rules. If the rule 
were also not “significant” for other reasons,134 the agency could, 
in theory, avoid review altogether. Although this has been a fo-
cus of OIRA attention, and stories of this sort of action have been 
reported,135 it is unclear to what extent this actually occurs.136 As 
noted above, the vast majority of rules currently undergoing 
regulatory review are not reviewed because they are “economi-
cally significant,” but for other reasons. 137 Therefore understat-
ing or “splitting” may be a strategy with limited utility. Moreo-
ver, as noted above, the $100 million threshold has become 
smaller over time due to inflation,138 so the challenge of under-
stating or splitting to fall below that threshold has become great-
er. The Executive Order also vests OIRA with the authority to 
make the final determination as to whether a particular rule is a 
significant regulatory action,139 further deterring understating or 
                                                                                                                               
 133. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 134. Id. (listing other reasons that an action can be significant, such as interfering 
with the plans of another agency, altering the impacts on grant or loan recipients, 
and raising novel legal issues). 
 135. See Nou, supra note 3, at 1792 n.205 (citing sources suggesting that agencies 
have tried splitting rules); OIRA Avoidance, supra note 3, at 999–1000 (focusing on 
agencies understating impacts). 
 136. Acs and Cameron, supra note 10, at 23, find no “clear-cut” evidence of this, 
but they note that the number of agency regulations that qualify as significant does 
change depending on how much the agency is audited. 
 137. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1868. 
 138. See supra note 50. 
 139. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,741 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
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splitting, particularly if an agency submits the different pieces of 
the rule around the same time. 
In addition, splitting a rule into smaller pieces to fall below OI-
RA’s “significance” threshold may be costly to agencies. Prepar-
ing multiple rule proposals will require additional cost, time, and 
staff resources, particularly for some standards that may be less 
susceptible to division—for example, a national ambient-air-
quality standard. And splitting a large rule into pieces may un-
dermine political package deals. Each individual piece of the rule 
may be more vulnerable to focused special-interest opposition. 
Finally, in a repeat-player relationship, the agency should an-
ticipate that OIRA could detect avoidance and impose sanc-
tions. Any regulated entity disgruntled by such a “split” rule 
could well alert OIRA, and OIRA could well view the com-
bined pieces as “economically significant” rules, giving OIRA a 
ready opportunity to impose sanctions. Indeed, on one report, 
OIRA reached an agreement with an agency to review the 
agency’s rules with economic impacts of over just $25 million, 
in part to deter splitting—suggesting that OIRA, at least, be-
lieved there was a reasonable risk of such conduct, but also il-
lustrating OIRA’s capacity to prevent such avoidance.140 Such 
an agreement, which effectively expands the scope of OIRA’s 
review beyond what is stated in the Executive Order, certainly 
sanctions the agency in question and would likely deter other 
agencies from trying the same thing. 
Among potential strategies for avoiding OIRA review, then, 
“splitting” seems easy to detect, insufficient to escape other cri-
teria for review, costly to the agency to undertake, and, in the 
context of repeated agency-OIRA interactions on regulatory 
review, subject to sanctions at relatively low cost to OIRA—the 
primary cost, beyond the likely low cost of detection, would be 
the staff resources required to engage in additional reviews. 
Understating impacts might be more difficult for OIRA to mon-
itor than splitting because it requires examining the details of 
the policy’s impacts. But it too can be noticed by OIRA and 
overcome by OIRA designating the rule for review, or requir-
ing retrospective reviews, especially if OIRA observes the 
                                                                                                                               
 140. Nou, supra note 3, at 1814 n.328 (reporting that for a time, EPA agreed to 
submit rules with an economic impact of over $25 million). 
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agency repeatedly issuing unreviewed rules that later look sig-
nificant.141 Thus, a game-theoretic analysis might indicate that 
agencies would not favor these “under the threshold” tactics. 
And as noted, Acs and Cameron have found little evidence of 
“splitting” over the years 1995–2010.142 
2. Guidance Documents 
Another tactic might be the agency use of so-called “guid-
ance documents” to make policy in lieu of issuing a notice-and-
comment rule. Generally, an agency’s issuance of a rule is sub-
ject to notice-and-comment requirements under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA); the agency must publish a pro-
posed rule, accept public comments, and consider them prior 
to finalizing the rule.143 Guidance documents, however, en-
compass two classes of agency actions that are exempt from 
these requirements—interpretive rules and general policy 
statements.144 The resources and time demanded by notice-and-
comment rulemaking likely have significantly contributed to 
an increased use of such guidance documents by agencies.145 
Agencies using guidance documents need not comply with the 
Administrative Procedure Act requirements to reply to public 
comments, for example. In some instances in which a rule 
would be subject to judicial review, agencies may be able to 
delay judicial review if they embody their policies in guidance 
                                                                                                                               
 141. See OIRA Avoidance, supra note 3, at 1010 (reporting that OIRA has changed 
the designation of numerous rules from nonsignificant to significant, and has done 
the reverse to a few rules). 
 142. See supra note 136. 
 143. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 144. See id. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
 145. E.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manu-
als, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1311, 1316 (1992) (“[I]t is manifest that nonobservance of APA rulemaking require-
ments is widespread.”); Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the 
Food and Drug Administration: Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 17, 25 (2005) (noting that FDA issues on average more than twice 
as many guidances as rules); see also David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegisla-
tive Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 295 (2010); Mark Sei-
denfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 331 (2011); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency 
Policy Making, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2007) (discussing heavier use of guidance 
documents compared to legislative rules). But see Raso, supra note 10, at 821 (finding 
that major decisions typically are not made via guidance document). 
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documents.146 Moderating the attractiveness of this strategy for 
agencies, however, is the fact that guidance documents are also 
inferior to rules in certain ways. These include the lack of legal-
ly binding effect and reduced judicial deference to agency legal 
interpretations contained in interpretive rules.147 
It is important to distinguish an agency’s incentives to mini-
mize APA requirements and judicial review from any incen-
tives to avoid OIRA review, however. With respect to OIRA 
review, although using guidances instead of rules may have 
been a permitted strategy to avoid review for a time, that is 
clearly not the case now. President Bush’s issuance of Execu-
tive Order 13,422 in January 2007 specifically directed agencies 
to submit “significant” guidance documents for OIRA re-
view.148 This instruction implies that such documents may not 
have been reviewed on a regular basis previously. The use of 
guidance documents appears to be one of the few agency 
avoidance tactics that has risen to the level of triggering a new 
Executive Order in response. In that Order, “significant” guid-
ance documents were defined as those having the same charac-
teristics, roughly, as “significant” rules, including those having 
an anticipated annual effect of $100 million or more or those 
raising novel or legal policy issues.149 The Order did not require 
preparation of regulatory impact analyses, but only a “brief 
explanation of the need for the guidance document and how it 
will meet that need.”150 Although President Obama has re-
scinded that Executive Order, OIRA has continued to assert the 
right to review significant guidance documents,151 stating that 
even before Executive Order 13,422, OIRA had long reviewed 
significant policy and guidance documents.152 
                                                                                                                               
 146. See Mendelson, supra note 145, at 411 (guidance documents may not be “ripe” 
for judicial review in circumstances in which notice and comment rules would be). 
 147. E.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 577 (2000) (interpretations 
contained in guidances and other agency documents lacking the force of law would 
receive reduced judicial deference). 
 148. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2765 (Jan. 23, 2007). 
 149. Id. at 2763–64. 
 150. Id. at 2764–65. Unlike OIRA review of regulations, the Order sets no deadline 
for OIRA review of guidance documents. 
 151. See Memorandum from Peter Orszag, supra note 44. 
 152. Id. (suggesting that such review had taken place from 1993 to 2007). 
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It remains unclear, however, how frequently and how exten-
sively that review is conducted. OIRA’s “historical records” of 
reviews for the last fifteen years (1998 through May 2013) list, 
at most, only a handful of guidance documents reviewed an-
nually, compared with hundreds of rulemaking documents.153 
Guidance document reviews, however, may not be systemati-
cally reported; for example, no information regarding the sub-
stance of guidance document reviews appears to be publicly 
available either on OIRA’s website or through 
www.regulations.gov.154 And many guidance documents, in-
cluding those that restate or summarize regulatory require-
ments for the lay reader or for agency staff, may simply not 
meet Executive Order criteria for significance. However, it 
seems clear that guidance documents, once reviewed, may be 
subject to change or reversal in the OIRA process, just as rules 
are.155 Most of those listed as having been reviewed are also 
listed as having been changed during the OIRA review pro-
cess—or even withdrawn.156 
Could agency use of guidance documents, given OIRA’s 
claim to be able to review them, still represent a serious device 
for avoidance of OIRA review? It seems unlikely that agencies 
could avoid review of policies altogether through the use of 
                                                                                                                               
 153. This database reports a peak of eight documents entitled “Guidance” re-
viewed by OIRA in 2010; in each other year, between zero and four documents enti-
tled “Guidance” were reported as undergoing OIRA review. Other document titles, 
however, might be considered “guidance,” so that these numbers underestimate the 
number of guidances OIRA has reported reviewing. See Executive Order Reviews 
Completed between January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010, REGINFO, 
http:www.reginfo.gov (follow “Regulatory Review,” then “Historical Reports.” In 
the first search bar click on “all” and in the second search bar, choose the year 
“2010;” in the next page, do a control-f search for “guidance,” 8 documents with the 
word “Guidance” appear); see also Nou, supra note 3, at 1785 (finding that, compared 
with the review of rules, guidance document review is “much more limited and 
unsystematic in practice”). 
 154. For example, the New York Times reported in mid-2012 that a significant 
EPA guidance was held up in OIRA review, but that guidance document does not 
appear in OIRA’s current or historical records, including OIRA’s report of its 
pending regulatory reviews. See www.reginfo.gov/public. To see the list of pend-
ing reviews, select “Regulations under EO 12866 Review.” Compare Editorial, 
Where Are the Clean Water Rules?, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2012, at A26, with REGINFO, 
http://www.reginfo.gov (follow “Regulations under EO 12866 Review.”). 
 155. See supra note 153 (reporting changes to reviewed guidance documents). 
 156. Id. 
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guidance documents. OIRA has been attending more specifical-
ly to guidance documents through, for example, OMB’s Bulle-
tin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, which instructs agen-
cies to obtain public feedback for all significant guidances, and 
to conduct a notice-and-comment process for economically sig-
nificant guidances and submit them for OIRA review.157 More-
over, interest groups affected by guidance documents are likely 
to bring issues of any importance to OIRA’s attention, much as 
they do for rules undergoing regulatory review. Further, agen-
cies are likely to anticipate countermoves or sanctions from 
OIRA, as they deal with OIRA repeatedly on both guidances 
and rules. Those repeat interactions and the prospect of coun-
termoves are likely to prompt agencies to make OIRA aware of 
significant guidance documents before they are issued.158 Once 
OIRA detects avoidance it could simply demand more detailed 
information on future guidance documents or review them 
more closely. Thus, in issuing its 2011 guidance document on 
which medical services would count as “essential health bene-
fits” under the Affordable Care Act, the Department of Health 
and Human Services provided advance public notice, received 
significant public input, and shared the document with OIRA, 
which cleared it.159 
Nou has argued that guidance documents may be “more dif-
ficult to reverse” in OIRA review because these documents are 
not legally binding and so the document’s “effects are un-
clear.”160 This may not be correct with respect to OIRA’s review 
authority, however. Although a guidance document will not 
have the same legal force as a rule, it will still—by design—
represent an agency’s policy announcement. OIRA would thus 
have an ability equivalent to that in regulatory review to sug-
gest, for example, that the agency consider alternatives or lan-
                                                                                                                               
 157. Memorandum from Rob Portman to the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf, [http://perma.cc/Q7PD-NSLF]. 
 158. See also Nou, supra note 3, at 1786 (noting that agencies will be “hesitant” to 
issue important documents unseen by senior officials). 
 159. See OIRA Conclusion of EO 12866 Regulatory Review, REGINFO, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDetails?rrid=121365 (reporting approval, 
“Consistent with Change,” of “Essential Health Benefits Bulletin,” RIN 0938-ZB06); 
Bagley & Levy, supra note 9. 
 160. Nou, supra note 3, at 1777. 
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guage revisions. The impacts of the guidance could be estimat-
ed by assessing it as if it were a binding rule, and then reflect-
ing its nonbinding character by adjusting the probability of 
both benefits and costs. Guidance documents may generally be 
less effective than binding rules, but sometimes possibly more 
effective, where “soft law” and “social norms” are more per-
suasive and yield less backlash than hard law. In short, com-
pared with some other avoidance techniques, guidance docu-
ments seem less likely to escape OIRA attention altogether. 
The more significant question is whether the use of guidance 
documents might allow agencies to avoid disciplining re-
quirements that would otherwise have applied through the 
regulatory review process. For example, an agency must pre-
pare a detailed cost-benefit analysis, including alternatives, for 
an economically significant rule undergoing OIRA review, but 
may not have to prepare such an analysis for an economically 
significant guidance.161 The Department of Health and Human 
Services’s use of a guidance document to define “essential 
health benefits” was criticized as permitting the agency to 
avoid preparing the cost-benefit analysis otherwise required by 
the Executive Order.162 Lars Noah has similarly criticized 
FDA’s use of guidance documents.163 
3. Other Subregulatory Statements 
We have already focused on the major form of subregulatory 
statement—guidance documents. Agencies can also issue even 
less formal statements of policy position. For example, an agency 
may write a letter answering a regulated entity’s question, per-
haps setting forth an interpretation or promising a safe harbor. 
Such a statement could be posted on an agency website, putting 
all regulated entities on notice.164 An agency may draft an inter-
                                                                                                                               
 161. Executive Order 12,866 does not speak specifically to guidance documents, 
and the Orszag memo does not make clear precisely which regulatory review re-
quirements apply to which guidance documents. See Memorandum from Peter Or-
szag, supra note 44. 
 162. Letter from Senator Michael B. Enzi et al. to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Jan. 13, 2012). 
 163. Noah, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
 164. E.g., Mike Dorning, OSHA Backs Down on Home Work Rules, CHI. TRIB. Jan. 28, 
2000, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-01-28/news/0001280152_1_osha-
ergonomic-home-offices, [http://perma.cc/0msff1wWDtV] (discussing “storm” pro-
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nal memorandum that then becomes public, or an agency official 
may give a speech that has the effect of publicly stating a new or 
changed agency policy. In this area, John Graham and Cory Liu 
give a vivid example of “rule-like” statements by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and other agencies, including a press 
release and an interagency agreement that had the effect of re-
stricting so-called “mountain top mining.”165 These could be un-
derstood as avoidance methods, as they are not subject to OIRA 
review or the other disciplining mechanisms, including cost-
benefit analysis for economically significant rules, contained in 
Executive Order 12,866. 
As with all the avoidance methods we discuss, how often 
agencies elect to make policy using such methods, and whether 
the desire to avoid presidential supervision plays a significant 
role in that decision, are empirical questions. For instance, in 
the mountaintop mining example described above, the White 
House was apparently involved in the decision—EPA’s press 
release described the policy being announced as that of the 
“Obama Administration.”166 It may be, however, that the deci-
sion was not subjected to disciplining measures such as cost-
benefit analysis because it was not formally reviewed by OIRA. 
Nonetheless, subregulatory statements may be among agen-
cies’ tools of avoidance. Besides potentially avoiding OIRA re-
view, an agency may also be able to minimize its APA obliga-
tions to publish, collect public comments, and respond to those 
comments. Meanwhile, the statement may still prompt changes 
in behavior among those the agency regulates, making it at least 
a somewhat effective device from the agency’s perspective. An 
agency may also be able to avoid judicial review, as these state-
ments typically would be considered neither final nor ripe.167 
These tools, however, do have their shortcomings. Unlike a rule, 
subregulatory statements are not legally binding, and it may be 
more difficult to apprise regulated entities of their existence. 
                                                                                                                               
voked by 2000 OSHA “interpretation letter,” later withdrawn, saying that an office-
ergonomics rule would apply to employees working from home). 
 165. See John D. Graham & Cory R. Liu, Regulatory and Quasi-Regulatory Activity 
Without OMB and Cost-Benefit Review, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 425. 426–30 (2014). 
 166. Id.  
 167. See Mendelson, supra note 145, at 411–12 (discussing judicial refusal to review 
guidance documents as not final or unripe).  
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An agency considering making such statements as a means 
of avoiding OIRA review would likely consider possible coun-
termoves. For example, other interested agencies or interest 
groups may bring such statements to OIRA’s attention, so it 
may be relatively easy for OIRA to detect avoidance efforts.168 
And there may be countermoves with respect to potential fu-
ture statements: OIRA or another White House office might 
contact the agency and request review of any significant sub-
regulatory statements, such as speeches, before they are given. 
The prospect of such countermoves may well deter the use of 
these statements as a means of avoiding review. 
4. “Bunching” or Combining Rules 
Another strategy could be for an agency to attempt to over-
whelm OIRA by sending numerous proposed or final rules at 
once or combining several rules into a larger and more com-
plex package, in the hope of raising the costs of review and ob-
taining less rigorous review of each individual rule. Again, in a 
game-theoretic framework, one must consider the likelihood of 
an avoidance strategy by assessing not only expected benefits 
and risks to the agency but also the agency’s anticipation of 
detection, sanctions, or potential countermoves from OIRA. 
Because “bunching” involves agency rules submitted to OIRA 
in the context of regular agency-OIRA interactions, OIRA 
would obviously be aware that it is being swamped. OIRA 
could respond by delaying review of relevant rules or asking 
the agency to prioritize and resubmit some of the rules at a lat-
er time. Although the Executive Order calls for a 90-day limit 
to review, that limit is often not followed,169 and an agency has 
little recourse when the time frame is exceeded, except possibly 
to try to draw the attention of public or congressional monitors. 
In theory, an agency could attempt to overwhelm OIRA by 
submitting its rule when deadlines are looming, whether statu-
tory or court-ordered, or at the end of a presidential administra-
tion.170 Others have suggested, however, that agencies may seek 
                                                                                                                               
 168. See Dorning, supra note 164 (ergonomics rule “interpretation letter” triggered 
storm and was withdrawn within 48 hours). 
 169. E.g., Stuck in Purgatory, supra note 93. 
 170. See, e.g., Acs & Cameron, supra note 10, at 448. 
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to insulate less at the end of a presidential term, on the theory 
that at that time, OIRA’s and the President’s preferences, like the 
agency’s, will also be for increased rulemaking.171 
With respect to submitting a rule for regulatory review close 
to a statutory or judicially imposed deadline, the immediate 
benefit to an agency in terms of minimizing review may be 
greater, because OIRA review is not a justification for noncom-
pliance with a required deadline.172 But, again, because this tac-
tic takes place in the very context of regulatory review, an 
agency could anticipate that OIRA would have the opportunity 
to countermove. At the beginning of new presidencies, White 
House chiefs of staff commonly require special reviews of the 
outgoing administration’s “midnight” regulations. Anticipat-
ing rules arriving with short deadlines, OIRA could reach out 
earlier to those agencies, require advance notice (through the 
Unified Agenda or otherwise), or link approval of the agency’s 
other pending rules (not facing deadlines) to the agency’s time-
liness in submitting a rule facing a deadline. 
5. Obfuscation and Other Means of Exploiting Information 
Asymmetry 
In theory, an agency might also seek to use its better control 
over information to raise the costs of review to OIRA. As men-
tioned above, the simplest example might be an agency’s ef-
forts to characterize a rule as not economically significant 
when, in reality, it is economically significant.173 But such an 
effort seems unlikely to succeed, given OIRA’s expertise in un-
derstanding regulatory costs and the possibility of OIRA coun-
termoves in repeat interactions with the agency. For example, 
OIRA could simply seek to review rules based on criteria other 
than economic impact, as provided in Executive Order 12,866 
and as currently happens in the great majority of reviews, or to 
review rules not clearly covered in the Executive Order.174 
A number of commentators have noted some variant of this 
tactic in the context of cost-benefit analysis. For example, Jen-
                                                                                                                               
 171. See Nou, supra note 3, at 1805. 
 172. See Nou, supra note 3, at 1798. 
 173. E.g., OIRA Avoidance, supra note 3, at 1010. 
 174. According to Lisa Heinzerling, OIRA already regularly engages in such prac-
tices. Heinzerling, supra note 29. 
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nifer Nou has suggested that agencies may submit “poorly 
translated” cost-benefit analyses to OIRA that are deliberately 
written in a way that is difficult to understand.175 Such obfusca-
tion could raise the costs to OIRA of reviewing the rule,176 
nudging OIRA to focus its scrutiny on other rules. Michael Liv-
ermore, while not arguing that agencies submit low-quality 
CBAs to frustrate review, has pointed out that an agency can 
carefully select alternatives to shape the outcome of cost-
benefit analysis.177 Livermore has argued more generally that 
the requirement to conduct CBA, wholly apart from any efforts 
to obfuscate or manipulate it, may favor the agency because the 
agency may have greater expertise than OIRA on the method-
ology of CBA, which could then benefit the agency during OI-
RA review.178 The interaction between the agency and OIRA 
over the methodology of CBA may work not to obfuscate re-
view or avoid OIRA, but rather to highlight the agency’s exper-
tise, to shape the terms of debates where the agency and OIRA 
disagree, and to advance the development of CBA methodolo-
gy in ways that both the agency and OIRA may welcome. 
Strategies to obfuscate or manipulate CBA can have pitfalls 
for the agency, moreover. OIRA might interpret a poorly writ-
ten CBA to signify a poorly conducted CBA, and as a result 
might be inclined to assess the agency’s proposal even more 
closely. Further, a poor CBA can undermine an agency’s efforts 
to gain outside allies for its regulatory proposal. Finally, in the 
context of ongoing repeat-play interactions over regulatory re-
view, the agency could anticipate that OIRA will make coun-
termoves as it becomes increasingly aware of the agency’s 
strategy. For example, OIRA could ask other agencies, includ-
ing, for example, staff from the Council of Economic Advisers, 
to scrutinize the obfuscating agency’s CBAs, or it could adopt a 
presumptive downward adjustment of the agency’s stated ben-
efits and upward adjustment of the agency’s stated costs that 
reflects OIRA’s greater uncertainty about their true values and 
gives the agency an incentive to clarify its estimates. 
                                                                                                                               
 175. Nou, supra note 3, at 1793. 
 176. See id. at 1795. 
 177. Livermore, supra note 81, at 19–20. 
 178. Id. at 2–3. 
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In general, the CBA-obfuscation problem is a variant of the 
classic principal-agent asymmetric-information problem, in 
which the expert agent may have more information than the 
principal and may choose modes of operating that raise the in-
formation costs to the reviewer. We note two other particular 
areas of asymmetric information. First, an agency is likely to 
have greater expertise in scientific issues specific to its field of 
regulation, such as biological and ecological information in the 
regulation of threats to endangered species, or toxicology, 
pharmacology, and epidemiology in the regulation of food, 
drugs, and toxic substances. Second, an agency (or in some cas-
es the Department of Justice) is likely to have longer experience 
than OIRA with the agency’s own legal issues, notably the 
courts’ interpretation of the agency’s statutes, such as the ex-
tent to which a particular regulatory approach is legally cir-
cumscribed or may increase the agency’s litigation risk if ag-
grieved parties seek judicial review. 
Again, however, this sort of avoidance strategy operates in 
the field of repeat play. In the short term, OIRA is a far more 
expert principal than, say, the typical patient who is seeking 
medical treatment from a physician. Moreover, OIRA may 
have other ready sources of information to supplement what it 
receives from the agency, including information from other 
agencies, White House offices, and outside groups with a stake 
in the particular rule. OIRA may also be able to develop greater 
expertise in an area over the long term by devoting increased 
resources to that area. And OIRA could adopt presumptions 
that adjust an agency’s unclear CBA estimates until the agency 
shows a better CBA. 
6. Incorporation by Reference of Private or International Standards 
Another possible technique for avoidance of OIRA review 
may be agency use of standards previously drafted by private 
or international groups, in lieu of “government-unique” stand-
ards. Private standards may be written by “standards devel-
opment organizations,” such as the American Society for Test-
ing and Materials, industry trade associations, or the 
International Standards Organization. Indeed, OIRA policy fa-
vors the use of such standards. Circular A-119 incorporates a 
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preference for voluntary consensus standards over govern-
ment-unique standards,179 as does the National Technology 
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995.180 Executive Order 
12,866 does not expressly exclude these standards from regula-
tory review, but Circular A-119 states that if an agency incor-
porates a voluntary consensus standard by reference, the 
“agency must comply with the ‘Principles of Regulation’ 
(enumerated in Section 1(b)) and with the other analytical re-
quirements of Executive Order 12,866, ‘Regulatory Planning 
and Review,’”181 perhaps implying that agencies need not for-
mally submit their proposals to OIRA for review. In any event, 
the policy embodied by Circular A-119 might conceivably 
prompt OIRA to review these standards more leniently, as the 
goal is to build on a private process in which a wide array of 
viewpoints have already been considered and in which many 
regulated entities may already be meeting the standards.182 A 
digital search in the Code of Federal Regulations for private 
standards that have been adopted by agencies but then modi-
fied in some way seems to bear this out; it shows only eighteen 
agency rules, out of thousands utilizing private standards, in 
which an agency both incorporated a private standard and 
modified it to some degree.183 Although these data are not con-
clusive, they suggest that OIRA policy may favor the incorpo-
ration without change of private standards, rather than modifi-
cation by the agency or through OIRA review. 
Thus, to the extent that an agency can identify a private 
standard that accords with the agency’s own goals for imple-
mentation of the statute, the agency may be able to avoid close 
                                                                                                                               
 179. Memorandum Concerning Circular No. A-119 from Franklin D. Raines, Dir., 
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, For Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Feb. 
10, 1998), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119, 
[http://perma.cc/0FTg1U1ExpH] [hereinafter Circular A-119 Memorandum]. 
 180. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-113, § 12(d) 110 Stat. 775, 783 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 272) (1996)) (requesting, 
unless inconsistent with applicable law or impractical, that all federal agencies use 
“technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus stand-
ards bodies . . . to carry out [the agency’s] policy objectives or activities”). 
 181. Circular A-119 Memorandum, supra note 179, § 6(f). 
 182. See id. § 2. 
 183. See Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to the Law: the Perplexing 
Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 782 & n. 259 (2014) (de-
scribing electronic searching method and conclusions).  
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OIRA review. From an agency’s perspective, however, the use 
of this strategy depends on locating suitable private standards. 
Currently, it is unclear how much use agencies may be making 
of this strategy. In addition, again, the agency would need to 
anticipate OIRA countermoves, such as efforts to review pri-
vate standards more closely or to expand the scope of review at 
an earlier stage of regulatory development. 
Agency use of international standards raises similar issues. 
In some cases, the effective use of the standards essentially re-
quires using them in their entirety if they are to be used at all. 
Deference to international standards, whether incorporated in 
treaties adopted by states, or in codes adopted by transnational 
private groups such as the International Standards Organiza-
tion, or the International Accounting Standards Board might be 
favored because these international standards reflect wide-
spread agreement and help avoid trade conflicts. We note, 
however, that OIRA has not given up all supervision in this 
area. The State Department and other agencies are supposed to 
consult with OIRA before making regulatory commitments in 
international agreements, including not only transnational pri-
vate standards, but regulatory commitments in public interna-
tional law as well.184 
7. Deferring or Delegating to State-Level Standards 
Rather than regulating directly, federal agencies may also 
implement policy by incorporating or relying on state-level 
policy. Federal agencies may decline to regulate in a particular 
area in view of existing state actions, adopt state standards, or 
authorize otherwise-preempted state regulation. For example, 
the FDA has not fully exercised its authority to set standards 
for bottled water, in part because of state actions.185 But agency 
inaction is not currently subject to OIRA review or any of the 
disciplining mechanisms in Executive Order 12,866.186 In their 
                                                                                                                               
 184. See 22 C.F.R. § 181.4(e)(2) (2013). This matches the agency’s obligation to con-
sult on the budget side. See 22 C.F.R. § 181.4(e)(1) (2013). 
 185. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-610, BOTTLED WA-
TER: FDA SAFETY AND CONSUMER PROTECTIONS ARE OFTEN LESS STRINGENT THAN 
COMPARABLE EPA PROTECTIONS FOR TAP WATER (2009). 
 186. But see Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, 
and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1382–83 (2013) (proposing OIRA review of 
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contribution to this issue, Graham and Liu discuss EPA’s grant 
of a Clean Air Act “waiver” from mobile-source standards to 
California’s zero-emissions-vehicle program.187 Although it is 
the Clean Air Act that authorizes California to regulate after 
receiving an EPA waiver, such waiver decisions may not be 
subjected to the same sort of OIRA oversight and cost-benefit 
analysis as if EPA had regulated directly. An interesting case 
may arise when EPA issues regulations, due in June 2014, to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants un-
der Clean Air Act section 111(d), which calls for the States to 
implement such standards: will OIRA’s review of the EPA rule 
include review of the expected state implementation plans? To 
take another example, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), which is tasked with defining “essential health 
benefits” under the Affordable Care Act, decided, in a guid-
ance document, to defer that definitional problem to the indi-
vidual states. Although that decision was subjected to OIRA 
review, it may have permitted HHS to bypass cost-benefit 
analysis requirements that would have applied had HHS made 
the decision directly. 
Even though these strategies may permit an agency to avoid 
or minimize regulatory review requirements that would oth-
erwise apply, there are undoubtedly trade-offs from the agen-
cy’s perspective. The major difficulty, of course, is that in defer-
ring to states, the agency cannot be assured that the policies 
made are the ones the agency believes are needed to implement 
the federal statute. 
                                                                                                                               
agency denials of rulemaking petitions). Although agency inaction (such as doing 
nothing, or denying a petition for rulemaking) may not currently be subject to OIRA 
review, agency deregulation—promulgating a new rule that rescinds or relaxes a 
prior rule—could be subject to OIRA review. 
 187. See Graham & Liu, supra note 165, at 431–39. OIRA does not currently review 
Clean Air Act waivers under Executive Order 12,866, because they are not consid-
ered rules. E.g., California State Nonroad Engine Pollution Control Standards; Off-
Road Compression Ignition Engines—In-Use Fleets; Notice of Decision, 78 Fed. Reg. 
58,090, 58,121 (Sept. 20, 2013) (“As with past authorization and waiver decisions, 
this action is not a rule . . . . [I]t is exempt from review by the Office of Management 
and Budget as required for rules and regulations . . . .”). OIRA may nonetheless be 
involved less formally. See generally Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Adminis-
trative Agencies: A Debate over Law or Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 643 (2010) 
(noting that EPA’s 2007 denial of California’s waiver request for automotive green-
house gas standards was “[a]fter interactions with OIRA”). 
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Further, to the extent these choices are made to avoid OIRA 
review, an agency should be anticipating OIRA countermoves. 
OIRA is likely well aware of decisions such as the EPA waiver 
for California or the HHS deferral to state definitions of “essen-
tial benefits.” Indeed, in the HHS example, OIRA was involved 
in reviewing the HHS guidance and may have requested to do 
so either because it was a “significant” guidance or because 
OIRA took an expansive view of its review authority. 
The problem of avoidance may be more troubling when an 
agency simply decides not to act. OIRA may not readily learn 
of the issue, particularly when those disadvantaged by agency 
deferral to state regulation are diffusely spread and poorly or-
ganized, as with bottled-water drinkers or other consumers. 
States may have suboptimal incentives to regulate, especially 
regarding interstate externalities. Nonetheless, there are coun-
termoves that OIRA could take. For example, OIRA Adminis-
trator John Graham started to issue “prompt letters,” not only 
to encourage agencies to consider removal of poorly function-
ing regulations, but also to encourage agencies to issue regula-
tions to address key problems where action was warranted. 
Examples of rules he prompted include FDA requirements for 
trans-fat content labels on food and OSHA rules on automatic 
defibrillators in the workplace. Citizens and outside entities 
were invited to submit suggestions for prompts to OIRA.188 It 
remains to be seen whether prompt letters will become a regu-
lar part of OIRA’s work. Livermore and Revesz have also sug-
gested that OIRA review agency inaction by expanding its re-
view to include agency denials of petitions for rulemaking.189 
8. Litigation and Settlements 
Another tactic that deserves attention is agency use of judg-
ments and consent decrees in defensive litigation to constrain 
regulatory decisionmaking. Such a tactic may effectively insu-
                                                                                                                               
 188. E.g., Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Oversight Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Energy Policy, Natural Resources & Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. On 
Oversight and Government Reform, 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of John D. Graham 
Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/testimony/ 
graham_house031202.pdf, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0ns2p7pgpBj]. 
 189. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 186, at 1382–85. 
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late the agency’s decision from OIRA review, an issue we have 
not seen discussed in other scholarship on OIRA avoidance. 
For example, an agency may be sued by a citizens’ group seek-
ing to implement a statutory rulemaking requirement or seek-
ing review of a rule. The judgment—if the agency loses or set-
tles—might specify the outlines of a rule that the agency is 
required to issue to resolve the litigation. Such consent decrees 
may be quite specific and even exclude alternatives or ap-
proaches that OIRA might favor. John Graham has given one 
example: an EPA consent decree committing EPA to regulate 
power-plant emissions.190 Once the consent decree is entered, it 
is legally binding, effectively limiting OIRA’s later involvement 
in the policy decisions at stake. Owing to the White House pol-
icy of refraining, without specific preclearance from the White 
House Counsel’s Office, from involvement in adjudication and 
agency enforcement—and from any contact with the Justice 
Department—there is currently little prospect of OIRA over-
sight of such settlements before judgment.191 
There are, however, important limitations on the use of this 
tactic. First, the opportunity to use the device depends on a 
lawsuit. The agency is unlikely to have control over the filing 
of such a lawsuit, although at least one scholar has recently 
suggested that dissatisfied agency officials have been known to 
invite filing.192 Further, the contents of the judgment are highly 
unlikely to be defined by the agency alone—instead, in a liti-
gated judgment, the agency is dependent on the judge’s deci-
                                                                                                                               
 190. Graham Testimony, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing rule aimed at reducing 
mercury emissions); see also Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, and the Sunshine for 
Regulating Decrees and Settlements Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 3041 and H.R. 3862 
Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. On the Judi-
ciary, 112th Cong. 41 (2012) (statement of David Schoenbrod, Trustee Professor of 
Law, New York Law School) (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 
(D.D.C. 1976)); id. at 28–29 (statement of Roger R. Martella, Jr., Sidley Austin LLP) 
(listing several examples, including EPA’s 2010 agreement via consent decree to 
issue greenhouse gas performance standards for utilities and refineries). 
 191. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 
1072 n.191 (2013) (citation omitted) (describing White House’s firm policy of no contact 
regarding pending agency adjudications (citing Memorandum from Charles F.C. Ruff, 
Counsel to the President and Daniel Marous, Senior Counsel (Nov. 24, 1988))). 
 192. See Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative 
Law Against Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129, 181 (2013). 
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sion. In a settlement, the agency must persuade its adversaries 
to sign on as well. 
Although these interactions involve some potential repeat 
play with OIRA—after all, they involve regulations, the subject 
of OIRA review—an agency might expect that, compared with 
the “splitting” or “bunching” scenario, OIRA will have fewer 
countermoves. Litigation settlements may be less frequent oc-
currences than an agency’s typical submission of rules for re-
view.193 Further, although this is defensive litigation, rather 
than agency enforcement, OIRA may be circumspect about di-
rect involvement as a countermove because of general concerns 
about the perception of political interference in agency litiga-
tion and adjudication.194 Therefore, it is worth being alert to 
possible increases in the use of this tactic. 
9. Enforcement Litigation 
Enforcement proceedings, like litigation settlements and ad-
judications, are moves away from rulemaking toward other 
forms of agency action that may avoid OIRA oversight. An 
agency could anticipate fewer opportunities for OIRA monitor-
ing and responses to these nonrulemaking modes. On the other 
hand, certain characteristics of these procedures may limit their 
appeal to agencies. 
Agency decisions to enforce (or not enforce) a statute may 
provide an avenue for avoiding OIRA review because, like 
rulemaking, these decisions can represent an exercise of the 
agency’s policy discretion. An agency may argue, in the context 
of an enforcement action, that a statute or regulation should be 
interpreted more broadly to cover a new species of action, or 
that particular conduct violates a general statutory prescription 
against “unreasonable” risks or injury to the environment. Con-
versely, an agency may decline to pursue cases in which a stat-
ute or regulation appears to be violated or may announce a safe 
                                                                                                                               
 193. See Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, and the Sunshine for Regulating Decrees 
and Settlements Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 3041 and H.R. 3862 Before the Subcomm. On 
Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 66 
(2012) (statement of John C. Cruden, President, Environmental Law Institute) 
(“[C]onsent decrees are actually hard to obtain.”). 
 194. See infra text accompanying notes 199–201 (discussing White House policy of 
refraining from involvement in agency enforcement and adjudication). 
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harbor from enforcement. As Andrew Morriss, Bruce Yandle, 
and Andrew Dorchak describe, for example, EPA “sued every 
heavy-duty diesel-engine manufacturer and obtained major sub-
stantive regulatory concessions from the industry in settlements 
of lawsuits.”195 Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst have famously 
discussed the case of the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration, which, in order to avoid the unfavorable judicial 
review that had been accorded its vehicle-safety rules, ended up 
shifting to a strategy of recalls—a strategy that Mashaw and 
Harfst strongly criticize.196 Finally, as Tim Wu has recently dis-
cussed, an agency may use the threat of an enforcement action to 
convey possible future policy choices and evoke changes in be-
havior.197 In this Issue, Jerry Brito responds to Wu by arguing 
that such tactics are overly coercive and that an agency that uses 
them is not necessarily serving the public interest.198 
Meanwhile, White House offices likely wish to avoid interfer-
ence—or any perception of interference—with individual agen-
cy enforcement decisions or adjudications, out of fear of being 
associated with the “crassest forms of partisan politics.”199 As a 
result, “internal White House rules . . . prohibit White House 
staffers from contacting agencies about specific enforcement ac-
tions [or agency adjudications] without preclearance from the 
White House Counsel’s Office.”200 Thus, an agency might antici-
pate few, if any, OIRA countermoves against agency enforce-
ment measures, compared with other avoidance tactics.201 
Although an agency selecting this tactic faces a reduced pro-
spect of OIRA countermoves, compared with, say, “splitting” a 
rule, policymaking through enforcement has other difficulties 
                                                                                                                               
 195. ANDREW P. MORRISS, BRUCE YANDLE, & ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION BY 
LITIGATION 1 (2009). 
 196. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 111 
(1990) (“The shift in emphasis from rules to recalls seemed to signal a reorientation of 
auto safety regulation, from science and planning to crime and punishment.”). 
 197. Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1843–44 (2011). 
 198. See Jerry Brito, “Agency Threats” and the Rule of Law: An Offer You Can’t Refuse, 
37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553 (2014). 
 199. See Andrias, supra note 191, at 1072 (citing Kagan, supra note 32, at 2357–58) 
(giving an example of Nixon Administration involvement in tax audits). 
 200. Id. at 1072 & n.190 (citing internal White House memoranda). 
 201. Andrias, however, has argued that the President should more thoroughly 
oversee and coordinate agency enforcement decisions writ large, in part because 
those decisions do encode policy choices. See generally Andrias, supra note 191. 
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that may deter agencies from using it. For example, this ap-
proach provides less advance notice to regulated entities com-
pared with a rule or rule-like document, and thus may evoke 
fewer immediate changes in behavior. Regulated entities may 
have to “read between the lines” to discern whether an agen-
cy’s individual enforcement decision represents a meaningful 
policy decision that will apply to others. By comparison, an 
agency’s use of a rule or even a nonbinding guidance docu-
ment would provide more notice and perhaps induce broader 
changes in behavior. 
In addition, relying on enforcement reduces an agency’s con-
trol over policymaking opportunities compared with rulemak-
ing. To bring such an action, the agency must have an appro-
priate target. And making policy through case-by-case incre-
incrementalism can require protracted effort over time. 
Finally, an adjudicator—either a judge or an agency adjudi-
cator (more on this below)—may have to be persuaded of the 
correctness of the agency’s position. This is true whether the 
agency elects to litigate its enforcement action or whether the 
regulated entity resists a “threat.” Meanwhile, the deci-
sionmaker will likely defer less to the agency’s position (em-
bodied in a brief) on the meaning of a statute than if it were 
embodied in a notice-and-comment rule. An agency brief 
would receive little, if any, deference, though Chevron defer-
ence would be accorded an agency interpretation in a rule.202 
Nonetheless, anyone concerned with OIRA avoidance tactics 
should consider whether the use of this policymaking form, 
like litigation settlements, might be increasing. 
10. Agency Adjudication 
Agencies’ ability to resolve issues by adjudication rather than 
rulemaking might serve as another avoidance tool. Long-settled 
doctrine permits an agency, in its discretion, to resolve policy 
issues through either method.203 With both adjudication and liti-
                                                                                                                               
 202. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (refusing to 
defer to agency interpretation expressed for first time in a brief). See generally 
Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that courts 
should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language in 
its authorizing statute). 
 203. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947). 
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gation, in contrast to rulemaking, the agency may seek to use the 
vehicle of an individual case to try to make policy, either by de-
claring policy itself in adjudicating a matter, or by persuading a 
court or other adjudicator to adopt its view of the law. Thus far, 
OIRA has no history of reviewing agency adjudication prior to 
decision, and, indeed, the ex parte contact rules applicable to 
formal adjudication as well as the strong custom of limits on ex 
parte contacts from White House officials regarding agency ad-
judications would be obstacles to such review.204 
This option may not be available to all agencies in all situa-
tions. Policymaking by more formal adjudication methods has 
been typical primarily of multimember independent commis-
sions such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal 
Communications Commission, National Labor Relations 
Board, and Federal Trade Commission. As “independent” 
agencies, these agencies already are currently exempt from OI-
RA review of their rules. Meanwhile, Congress specifically re-
quires some agencies to use rulemaking, rather than adjudica-
tion, in certain contexts.205 Adjudication in other agencies may 
be conducted primarily by independent administrative law 
judges, with agency heads only very rarely involved.206 But in 
some instances, an executive-branch agency may have the op-
tion to shift policy decisionmaking from rulemaking or guid-
ance to adjudication.207 The Department of Health and Human 
Services, for example, possesses the authority to resolve cost-
reimbursement issues under Medicare either through regula-
                                                                                                                               
 204. See Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 
1545–46 (9th Cir. 1993) (extending APA’s ex parte communications ban to White 
House staff and the President). The source of this prohibition, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d), ap-
plies only to formal agency proceedings. Nonetheless, the White House retains a 
policy of avoiding contact with respect to any adjudication. See, e.g., Andrias, supra 
note 191, at 1072 n.191 (citation omitted). 
 205. Magill, supra note 128, at 1389. 
 206. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2012) (prohibiting ALJ from being supervised by 
someone from investigative part of agency); id. § 556 (describing functions of ALJ in 
formal adjudication); id. § 557 (prohibiting ex parte contacts); id. § 3105 (prohibiting 
agency from assigning ALJ duties inconsistent with judicial functions). 
 207. See Raso, supra note 10, at 822 (suggesting that OIRA efforts to review guid-
ance documents may drive agencies to shift to adjudication). 
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tions or through adjudication.208 And as then-Professor, now-
Dean Elizabeth Magill has described, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (now the U.S. Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Service) used so-called “precedent” decisions of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals to resolve visa-standards require-
ments, rather than using new rulemaking.209 Further, as Dean 
John Graham and Cory Liu describe in this Issue, EPA effec-
tively set policy on mountaintop mining in part through per-
mitting decisions (or denials) on 175 mine sites.210 
Although adjudication may be a way to avoid OIRA review 
of policy decisions, it has other pitfalls that may deter an agen-
cy from using it. An agency may receive less deference for an 
interpretation rendered in an informal adjudication, compared 
with one issued in a rule.211 An agency interpretation rendered 
in a formal adjudication—or an adjudication that is conducted 
with significant procedural formalities—will still be eligible for 
Chevron deference, however.212 Further, as with enforcement 
actions, adjudication requires an appropriate target to come 
along, reducing an agency’s ability to use it proactively. The 
agency may need to receive an application for a permit that 
provides it with an opportunity to act, for example. On the oth-
er hand, if an appropriate target does come along, an agency 
may have more flexibility rapidly to advance a new approach 
to statutory implementation.213 
11. Coalition Building 
Agencies may try to assemble coalitions of allies favoring a 
rule in an attempt to raise the costs to OIRA of changing or re-
turning that rule.214 Such coalitions may include advocacy 
                                                                                                                               
 208. E.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) (upholding 
agency’s use of adjudication to resolve particular questions in “specific applica-
tions of a rule”). 
 209. Magill, supra note 128, at 1403. 
 210. See Graham & Liu, supra note 165, at 426–30. 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (refusing Chev-
ron deference for informal Customs Service adjudications). But see City of Arlington 
v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 212. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 213. Cf. Wu, supra note 197, at 1842 (defending regulatory threats as a flexible poli-
cymaking device). 
 214. Nou, supra note 3, at 1798–99. 
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groups, other federal agencies, state agencies, and industry 
subgroups that benefit from the rule. 
As part of such a tactic, the agency could disclose OIRA’s 
comments on the rule in order to bring political pressure to 
bear on OIRA. Executive Order 12,866 provides for public dis-
closure of changes made through the OIRA regulatory review 
process, although it does not apply to all OIRA-agency interac-
tions,215 and the disclosed documents are often incomplete or 
difficult to locate.216 To be sure, notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing is intrinsically a public process, and disclosure of docu-
ments exchanged by OIRA and the agency during review is 
already required, so it may be difficult to characterize disclo-
sure as “avoidance.” 
To the extent OIRA perceives coalition-building or disclosure 
of OIRA comments as a form of avoidance or a way to tie OI-
RA’s hands, the agency that uses coalition-building operates in 
a field of repeat interactions with OIRA. Therefore, the agency 
may anticipate countermoves from OIRA, whether those are 
competing disclosures, more challenging review of the particu-
lar regulatory proposal, linkage to review of other rules, or, 
over the longer term, changes in the disclosure rules.217 
12. Being or Becoming an “Independent” Agency 
We include this status as a tactic in the interest of making our 
typology as complete as possible, because rules proposed by in-
dependent regulatory agencies are not currently subject to OIRA 
regulatory review requirements.218 As our discussion of this issue 
in Part I suggests, however, presidential executive orders may be 
attempting gradually to extend control over the independent 
agencies.219 And at least one bill is now pending in Congress to 
                                                                                                                               
 215. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51, 735, 51, 740–42 (Oct. 4, 1993). For 
example, changes the agency makes in a proposal through informal consultation 
with OIRA before the formal initiation of the regulatory review process are not 
subject to disclosure. 
 216. See Mendelson, supra note 57, at 1149. 
 217. See Heinzerling, supra note 29 (arguing that “[i]f OIRA wanted to review 
something, OIRA reviewed it,” even if draft rules were not particularly novel or 
economically significant). 
 218. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,737. 
 219. See Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587, 41,587 (July 14, 2011); see also 
Katzen Testimony, supra note 6, at 38. 
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expressly confirm the President’s authority to order independent 
agencies to submit to the OIRA regulatory review process.220 
Is agency independence truly an avoidance tactic? Typically, 
the agency does not have a choice—instead, it is made inde-
pendent by Congress (and the President) in the agency’s au-
thorizing statute, sometimes as confirmed by a court.221 Yet of-
ficials leading an agency (or its constituency interest groups) 
may be able, over the long term, to influence the agency’s for-
mal independence from the President. An agency can appar-
ently persuade the courts that it is independent, even if its au-
thorizing statute lacks express statutory limits on the 
President’s power to remove the agency’s head.222 Or, an agen-
cy could persuade Congress to confer independent status on it 
by statute. For example, consider the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau (CFPB), created in the Dodd-Frank legislation 
and placed on the list of independent agencies under the Pa-
perwork Reduction Act.223 Besides assuming some new func-
tions, the Bureau also took over functions previously located in 
other agencies, including executive branch agencies such as the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the 
Treasury Department.224 One could imagine, therefore, a long-
term strategy to persuade Congress to transfer particular regu-
latory functions from an executive agency to an independent 
one. Needless to say, this is not a strategy with guaranteed suc-
cess, as it depends on congressional cooperation both in the 
creation of the entity and in the confirmation of like-minded 
agency officials to run it. 
                                                                                                                               
 220. Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2013, S. 1173, 113th Cong. 
(2013). 
 221. E.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3148–49 (2010) (deciding case on the “understanding” that SEC was an independent 
agency, subject to presidential removal only for cause, despite lack of express “for 
cause” discharge provisions). 
 222. See id. See generally Datla & Revesz, supra note 46; Adrian Vermeule, Conven-
tions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013). 
 223. See Nou, supra note 3, at 1835 (discussing Congress’s expressly amending the 
Paperwork Reduction Act to list the new CFPB as an independent agency, and sug-
gesting that Congress could do so for other agencies as well). 
 224. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521–23 (2010) (transferring existing agency con-
sumer-protection functions to CFPB). 
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Whether agencies’ independence from presidential oversight 
waxes or wanes in the future, the current existence of some in-
dependent agency regulation offers a sort of observational ex-
periment for analysts to observe the impact of avoiding OIRA. 
Acs and Cameron use independent agencies as controls in their 
empirical work.225 Former OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen 
has commented that independent regulatory agencies far less 
often engage in disciplined analyses of costs and benefits.226 
This distinction, however, may become blurred over time as 
independent agencies bow to Executive Order 13,579 or to 
court decisions interpreting their regulatory statutes227 by start-
ing to conduct their own RIAs using CBA.228 
III. EVALUATING RESPONSE MEASURES TO REDUCE AVOIDANCE 
A. Avoidance and Response in a Repeated Game 
Observing the possibility of agency avoidance does not by it-
self predict its frequency or severity, nor does it indicate which 
countermeasures should be taken in response. As we have dis-
cussed in detail above, agencies have some incentives to coop-
erate with OIRA review, and even if an agency seeks to avoid 
OIRA review, it would anticipate countermoves—from OIRA, 
other White House officials, other agencies, courts, interest 
groups, and other parties—that might induce the agency none-
theless to comply. We have emphasized that an agency re-
quired to submit rules to OIRA for review can expect to deal 
with OIRA in a continuing repeat-play relationship, so that no 
tactic or response can be viewed in isolation.229  
Agencies might well expect some repercussions, or at least 
distrust, to result from avoidance tactics. To the extent that an 
agency builds a reputation for avoidance, OIRA might review 
                                                                                                                               
 225. Acs & Cameron, supra note 10, at 4. 
 226. Katzen Testimony, supra note 6, at 39 (“[Independent regulatory commis-
sions] do not typically engage in the analysis that has come to be expected for Exec-
utive Branch agencies.”). 
 227. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 228. See, e.g., Memorandum from Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation and 
Office of Gen. Counsel to Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. & Offices, US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) (Mar. 16, 2012). 
 229. See generally Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 117; Tiller & 
Spiller, supra note 117. 
508 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 37 
 
more aggressively all the agency’s rule submissions to ensure 
compliance with regulatory review requirements. This could 
increase overall delays and resource demands on the agency. 
Relatedly, OIRA might move to develop more in-house exper-
tise to enable more extensive regulatory review of that agency 
or that field of expertise.230 And OIRA might offer more favora-
ble treatment to agencies that cooperate earlier and more fully 
in regulatory review, such as faster processing of submissions, 
more assistance in shaping proposals, or credit for issuing reg-
ulations that deliver net benefits.231 Conceivably, OMB might 
threaten to cut an uncooperative agency’s budget. Presidents 
might appoint “tougher” agency heads, less sympathetic to the 
agency’s mission, who will more sternly manage agency ac-
tion.232 Congressional committees might undertake investiga-
tions that are costly to the agency and distract it from its mis-
sion, and Congress might enact new legislation adding review 
burdens. Courts might review the agency’s rulemakings more 
stringently and might grant greater deference to agency actions 
that have successfully undergone OIRA review. 
An agency’s anticipation of such response moves might 
prompt it to be more selective in seeking to avoid review. Or 
the agency might foresee further openings; for example, if an 
agency tries to avoid OIRA by splitting large rules into more 
numerous smaller rules, the agency could anticipate that OIRA 
would respond by expanding its review to cover smaller rules. 
But that could stretch OIRA’s staff resources even thinner, rais-
ing the costs to OIRA of reviewing other (important) rules, and 
thus giving agencies more latitude on those other rules. Antici-
pating such a scenario, OIRA could seek more staff resources 
                                                                                                                               
 230. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1871 (“[I]n recent years [OIRA] has gener-
ally had two scientists on its staff . . . .”). 
 231. For the idea that OIRA could give agencies incentives to cooperate by giving 
them credit for issuing regulations that deliver net benefits (credit that can be used 
by the agency to cover other regulations that do not yield net benefits, so long as the 
agency’s total credit account stays positive), see Eric Posner, Using Net Benefit Ac-
counts to Discipline Agencies: A Thought Experiment (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, 
Ctr. For Bus. & Gov’t, Working Paper RPP-2002-01, 2002). 
 232. See Acs & Cameron, supra note 10, at 24 (finding some evidence that the ad-
ministration of President George W. Bush achieved some reduction in rulemaking 
through the appointment of agency heads (as opposed to via OIRA review)); cf. 
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2764 (Jan. 23, 2007) (requiring each regula-
tion to be approved by high-level officer in each agency) (later rescinded). 
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from the President and Congress; in turn, the agencies, interest 
groups favoring agency action or interest groups favoring OI-
RA review might also lobby Congress. Meanwhile, the agency 
might shift to modes of action that are more difficult for OIRA 
to monitor, such as adjudication, enforcement, and litigation 
settlements. These in turn might elicit further responses. 
Each institutional actor233 may try to foresee several choice 
points on a large decision tree, and may try to estimate the 
costs to itself and to its counterpart of each choice set. One im-
plication is that agencies may already anticipate response 
measures in considering avoidance, so concerns that avoidance 
could be widespread may be overstated (although avoidance in 
specific instances may still be important). Or concerns about 
types of avoidance tactics that are easy for OIRA to monitor 
may be overstated, and the more serious issue may be other 
avoidance tactics that are more difficult to monitor. When 
evaluating agency avoidance and potential responses, it is not 
enough to observe the possibility of agency avoidance through 
one tactic or another; analysts must consider multiple avoid-
ance tactics, multiple response options, multiple actors, scenar-
ios of repeated interactions of moves and countermoves, and 
the pros and cons of each path. 
B. Evaluating Each Response Option 
How serious is agency avoidance of OIRA, and what should 
be done about it? The question mirrors the evaluation of agen-
cy regulation (how serious are market dysfunctions and social 
problems, and what should be done about them?) and the 
evaluation of OIRA oversight (how serious are government 
dysfunctions and regulatory problems, and what should be 
done about them?).  
We note that taking a game-theoretic approach to these issues, 
as we do here—and hence suggesting that OIRA and the agen-
cies may already be trying to anticipate each others’ potential 
future strategic moves—does not necessarily imply that there is 
already an efficient cooperative equilibrium that obviates the 
need to evaluate the desirability of response measures to agency 
                                                                                                                               
 233. As discussed above, the motivations of the multiple individual actors within 
a single agency conceivably can vary, further complicating this analysis. 
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avoidance. Even if the agencies and OIRA are already anticipat-
ing future moves and have achieved some stable equilibrium, 
that equilibrium may not be fully socially optimal if it reflects 
the particular strategic interests of these actors rather than full 
societal interests. Moreover, a stable equilibrium may be elusive 
because information costs, uncertainties, new policy frontiers, 
new arrays of agencies and interest groups, new avoidance tac-
tics and responses, and other factors may keep relations evolv-
ing. Thus there is a continuing need to evaluate the normative 
desirability of responses to agency avoidance.  
In our view, the question of what should be done about 
agency avoidance calls for an evaluative framework for re-
sponse options that mirrors the evaluative framework that OI-
RA asks of agencies: consider the impacts, including both bene-
fits and costs, of response options. Just as the presence of 
market failure offers a prima facie case but an insufficient basis 
for regulating (because we must also consider the costs and 
benefits of regulatory policy options), so the presence of agen-
cies avoiding OIRA offers a prima facie case but an insufficient 
basis for OIRA responses (because we must also consider the 
costs and benefits of the response options). 
This question depends in part on how one views OIRA over-
sight. Some may see agency avoidance as an alarm signal re-
garding overbearing presidential control. Others may see agen-
cy avoidance as a violation of electoral accountability and 
sensible regulatory oversight. Without reproducing here the 
full debate over the merits of OIRA oversight,234 one can see the 
                                                                                                                               
 234. OMB and OIRA’s own annual reports tout the net benefits of the agency 
rules that were issued under its review. But it is unclear how much one should 
attribute those results to OIRA review. And those reports rely on the agencies’ 
own ex ante RIAs, rather than on OIRA’s independent analysis. See Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs: Federal Regulations and Regulatory Reform Under the 
Obama Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm, on Courts, Communal & Admin. 
Law of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 51 (2012) (statement of Richard 
A. Williams, Director of Policy Research, Mercatus Center, George Mason Univer-
sity). For a study attempting to estimate the net benefits of the U.S. system of OI-
RA review, see Robert W. Hahn, An Evaluation of Government Efforts to Improve 
Regulatory Decision Making, 3 INT’L REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 245, 247 (2010) 
(finding overall impacts plausibly net positive, but difficult to measure). For a 
study comparing RIA systems across OECD member countries, see Peter Carroll, 
Does regulatory impact assessment lead to better policy?, 29 POL’Y & SOC’Y 113 (2010) 
(finding poor RIA performance in many countries, and attributing this to weak 
 
No. 2] Responding to Agency Avoidance 511 
 
merit in applying OIRA’s own evaluative framework for agen-
cy regulation to the choices among response options to agency 
avoidance. Evidence of avoidance may warrant some response, 
but one should assess the pros and cons of a variety of re-
sponses. Thus, we propose that response measures to address 
agency avoidance of OIRA should, in principle, be evaluated similarly 
to OIRA’s evaluation of agency regulations: thorough assessment 
of benefits and costs (broadly understood) and comparison to 
alternatives, including a no-action alternative. 
Our proposal frames the problem of agency avoidance and re-
sponse measures as a problem of optimal regulation—not only 
optimal agency regulation of private activities, but also optimal 
OIRA regulation of agencies. We use the term “optimal” here in 
the broad sense of social well-being (recognizing that there are 
varied approaches to assessing social well-being). This approach 
avoids the hard line positions of either OIRA maximalists (seek-
ing complete oversight and zero avoidance) or OIRA minimalists 
(seeking to eliminate all OIRA review); for each of those extremes, 
the answer to agency avoidance seems preordained. We submit 
that a truly careful analyst of regulatory policy would favor nei-
ther extreme and would seek to evaluate the pros and cons of 
each option. We contend that those concerned about agency 
avoidance of OIRA should not resist our proposal—or, if they do, 
it should cause them to reconsider why they favor OIRA review 
(which applies a similar framework) to begin with. Our proposal 
focuses inquiry on the optimal regulation of agency compliance 
with regulatory review. In so doing, it promotes a meta-level of 
analysis: in a rough sense, this would be impact assessment of 
impact assessment, applying CBA to CBA, although we recognize 
that a formal quantitative CBA of each response option may not 
be appropriate, and that there are varied approaches to CBA. The 
broader need is really for impact assessment of oversight (which may 
include RIA and CBA as well as other elements). Our point is that 
choosing how best to respond to agency avoidance of OIRA over-
sight ought to involve a balanced evaluation of the benefits and 
                                                                                                                               
oversight institutions in those countries). As more countries adopt regulatory 
oversight systems, comparing across countries could be a promising way to study 
this question. See Jonathan B. Wiener, The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 123 (Mi-
chael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013). 
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costs of the additional steps to enforce regulatory review, includ-
ing consideration of alternatives. 
Our proposal therefore requires consideration of core issues 
that are similar to those now raised in OIRA review of agency 
regulations, notably the following: 
1. How serious is the problem of agency avoidance? Just 
as OIRA regulatory review requires the agency to as-
sess the extent of market failure or other problems, 
and to prepare a risk assessment of the likelihood and 
consequences of pollution or other externalities, so 
the evaluation of responses to agency avoidance 
should include at least a basic assessment of the ex-
tent of the avoidance problem, its likelihood, and its 
consequences for the regulatory system and society. 
These characteristics may, of course, depend on the 
type of avoidance that is occurring and the potential 
response options. Our analysis above, in Part II, of the 
typology of avoidance tactics (and response options 
in a repeated game), helps frame this inquiry. At the 
same time, gathering information has cost as well as 
value. Empirical study or other assessment of the se-
riousness of avoidance may be costly in effort and es-
pecially in time. And gathering such information will 
be most valuable where it would significantly im-
prove the choice among response measures. An im-
plication of this cost-of-information/value-of-
information approach is that high-cost response 
measures may warrant more empirical inquiry (be-
cause the value of reducing those response costs is 
greater), while low-cost response measures may be 
worth undertaking even on a less-than-
comprehensive empirical assessment. 
2. What are the plausible alternative response options? 
Just as OIRA regulatory review requires agencies to 
identify and evaluate several alternative regulatory 
options—including the option of no action—so the 
evaluation of responses to agency avoidance should 
include a range or set of alternative response options, 
including the option of no response. We sketch a ty-
pology of response options below. 
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3. What are the benefits and costs of these alternative re-
sponse options? Which options would have benefits 
that justify their costs? Although we recognize that a 
formal cost-benefit analysis may not be appropriate 
(due to its own costs, and the difficulty of quantifying 
the impacts of procedural changes), the evaluation of 
response options to agency avoidance should nonethe-
less be thoughtful and systematic. It should apply the 
same principle to assess response options that OIRA 
requires for evaluation of agency regulation: the eval-
uation of benefits and costs across a range of alterna-
tives. In proportion to the costs and benefits of the 
analysis for improving the decision about response op-
tions, the analysis should include all important im-
pacts—both quantitative and qualitative, both intend-
ed and ancillary (including both ancillary harms and 
ancillary benefits)—and it should pay attention to both 
overall social well-being and distributional equity.235 
Additionally, evaluation of avoidance and response options 
could benefit from comparing oversight systems across the 
United States, the European Union, and other countries.236 
As to the seriousness of the problem, it remains unclear 
whether avoidance of OIRA is actually widespread and seri-
ous. This again depends on the type of avoidance. Agencies 
may have good reasons and incentives to cooperate with OIRA 
review, especially in a repeat-player relationship. Agencies’ 
incentives to cooperate or avoid might differ when facing OI-
RA review as compared to judicial review, and when consider-
ing different types of avoidance tactics as well as different re-
                                                                                                                               
 235. See generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, 59 CURRENT LE-
GAL PROBS. 447 (2006) (discussing “warm analysis” and “proportionate analysis” as 
intermediate analytic methods that ensure that all important impacts are considered 
by the decisionmaker, rather than limiting analysis only to precisely quantified im-
pacts or only to intended impacts, by expanding the analysis to include qualitative, 
ancillary (both harm and benefit), and distributional impacts, and by scaling the 
degree of analysis to the improvement expected in the decision from this analysis 
compared to the costs of such analysis). 
 236. See generally Carroll, supra note 234; Wiener, supra note 234; Jonathan B. Wie-
ner & Alberto Alemanno, Comparing regulatory oversight bodies across the Atlantic: the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the US and the Impact Assessment Board in 
the EU, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 309, 309–35 (Susan Rose-Ackerman 
& Peter Lindseth eds., 2010). 
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sponses to avoidance. Further empirical analysis is needed to 
understand how often agencies avoid OIRA review, in what 
ways, and with what consequences.237 Still, it remains possible 
that avoidance may be occurring in just a few, but very im-
portant, cases, or at just a few agencies;238 or that it is occurring 
more often but in ways that previous studies have not cap-
tured. OIRA needs a risk assessment of agency avoidance, go-
ing beyond initial examples of avoidance tactics, to assess their 
likelihood and severity in the context of repeat playing. As we 
have emphasized above, the avoidance tactics on which there 
has been the most focus—such as the use of guidance docu-
ments instead of rules and attempts to understate the economic 
significance of rules or to split them into smaller pieces—may 
turn out to be less likely to escape OIRA review when OIRA 
and the agency have repeated interactions over time. Mean-
while, other tactics, such as the use of enforcement efforts and 
litigation settlements binding the agency to regulate, may turn 
out to be more likely to escape OIRA oversight, but may also be 
deterred by these tactics’ reduced effectiveness as policymak-
ing methods. These are our conjectures; more empirical study 
is needed (subject to its own costs and value) to understand the 
frequency of each tactic, the likelihood of escaping oversight, 
and the consequences of avoidance. 
Even if agency avoidance of OIRA is significant, it remains 
an open question which remedies, if any, would be warranted 
in response. This depends on the incentives of the actors, the 
type of avoidance, the type of response, and the consequences 
of each. As noted above, a good evaluation of response options 
to agency avoidance requires an assessment of alternative re-
sponse options (including no action) and their full impacts. 
Some response options may be desirable, but others may be 
worse than not acting. Response options may be costly—in di-
rect expenses, in the opportunity costs of diverting oversight 
resources from other more valuable tasks, and in the costs of 
delaying agency actions that would offer net benefits to the 
President and to society. Given these costs, and OIRA’s con-
                                                                                                                               
 237. Jennifer Nou agrees that the question is empirical. Nou, supra note 3, at 1836; 
see also Acs & Cameron, supra note 10, at 1; Raso, Strategic or Sincere?, supra note 10, 
at 782; Raso, Agency Avoidance, supra note 10, at 3. 
 238. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 11, at 5–7. 
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strained resources (in budget, staff, and time),239 the optimal 
level of enforcement of OIRA oversight is unlikely to be 100%, 
which is to say that the optimal level of agency avoidance is 
likely to exceed zero. The optimal (net-benefit maximizing) 
strategy for OIRA would consciously tolerate some agency 
avoidance (where the benefits of prevention do not justify the 
costs of prevention). This is akin to the similar point that opti-
mal agency regulations should not seek 100% compliance or 
100% elimination of the regulated private activity (zero risk), 
because there are rising costs to regulating and enforcing too 
stringently.240 Even some unintended “regulatory slippage” can 
be tolerable when the costs of preventing it are considered.241 
The analysis of response options could also examine institu-
tional considerations, such as regard for agencies’ statutory re-
sponsibilities and for effective presidential oversight. 
Based on our discussion in Part II of potential responses to 
several types of agency avoidance, here we sketch the follow-
ing incomplete and non-exhaustive set of response options. 
Many of these may already be in use by OIRA or others; some 
may not. We do not necessarily advocate (or reject) any of 
these; our point is that multiple alternative response options 
need to be evaluated for their costs and benefits. We have al-
ready noted some of the accompanying costs and benefits in 
Parts II and III.A above (for example, potential agency coun-
termoves, and constraints on White House involvement in 
agency adjudications or enforcement proceedings). 
A more complete analysis would match each response option 
with the type of avoidance tactic to which it responds (as indi-
cated briefly in each tactic’s subsection of Part II above). One 
can imagine a table listing three columns: oversight require-
                                                                                                                               
 239. Nou, supra note 3, at 1814–15 (noting that the President may have good rea-
sons not to “maximize control” of the agencies, because his “resources [are] con-
strained” and he must be “selective” in requiring review). Nou also notes that re-
laxed review might be a bargaining chip that the President could offer to an agency 
or a constituency favoring some regulation. Id. at 1815. Nou, however, does not ex-
pressly advocate a systematic analysis of the benefits and costs of responding to 
purported agency avoidance. 
 240. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1988); BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK (1981). 
 241. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 298–300 (1999). 
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ments, agency avoidance tactics, and corresponding oversight 
responses. But that sketch immediately points out that several 
different response options (or more than one) could be used in 
response to each avoidance tactic. If so, each cell in the column 
of response options could grow to resemble the full list. Selec-
tion among them would depend on their costs and benefits in 
the specific case. And then the table would need another col-
umn for the agency’s countermoves, and so on.  
Possible response measures (by OIRA, the President, the 
courts, Congress, or other actors) include: 
1. Earlier engagement, such as: 
a. Earlier notice of upcoming agency actions (for 
example, via the Regulatory Agenda) 
b. Earlier collaboration between OIRA and agen-
cies on initial development, framing, and 
analysis of regulatory options and alternatives 
c. Early approval, “pre-clearance,” or “fast 
track” of selected agency actions 
d. “Prompt” letters to encourage agency action 
on policies with promising net benefits 
e. Credit for net benefits, or other steps to en-
courage desirable agency action 
2. Later monitoring of actions that may have avoided 
review, such as: 
a. Spot checks 
b. Communications from affected parties 
c. A petition process, in which parties can for-
mally seek OIRA review of policies that agen-
cies have pursued without OIRA review (via 
any avoidance tactic) 
d. Review of agency decisions not to pursue poli-
cies, despite potentially positive net benefits (for 
example, an agency denial of a petition for 
rulemaking, or deregulation, or agency inaction) 
e. Retrospective reviews of existing regulations 
(including reviews of policies that underwent 
ex ante review and reviews of some that did 
not or that should have but avoided review) 
f. Empirical analysis of trends in agency actions 
3. Broader scope of review of rule-like actions, such as: 
No. 2] Responding to Agency Avoidance 517 
 
a. Smaller (lower impact) rules 
b. Guidance documents 
c. Policy statements, letters, websites, FAQs, etc. 
4. Broader scope of review of litigation affecting regula-
tion, such as: 
a. Litigation settlements that bind agencies regu-
latory choices 
b. Agency adjudications 
c. Agency enforcement actions 
5. Broader scope of review of regulation by or with oth-
er actors, such as: 
a. Regulation by states in concert with federal 
agencies—for example when federal agencies 
authorize, shape, delegate, adopt, or defer to 
states’ policies 
b. Regulation by international treaties, agree-
ments, or organizations—for example when 
federal agencies negotiate, delegate, adopt, or 
defer to such policies 
c. Regulation by private groups—for example 
when federal agencies authorize, shape, dele-
gate, adopt, or defer to such standards, codes, 
or norms 
6. Broader scope of oversight over “independent” agen-
cies, such as: 
a. Asking ”independent” agencies to review the 
impacts of their existing regulations and policies 
b. Asking ”independent” agencies to prepare 
RIAs using CBA on their proposals for new 
regulations and policies 
c. Requiring ”independent” agencies to be sub-
ject to presidential oversight, including OIRA 
review 
d. Blurring or ending the distinction between ex-
ecutive and ”independent” agencies, at least 
with regard to regulatory oversight (whether 
eliminating or retaining differences in the 
power to remove the agency head) 
7. Greater resources for OIRA, such as: 
a. More funding and staff 
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b. Staff from more diverse fields of expertise 
c. Capacity to conduct some of its own impact 
assessments of selected agency policies, both 
ex ante and ex post, rather than relying only 
on the agencies’ analyses 
8. Calibration of oversight, such as: 
a. Using OIRA’s authority to trigger review of 
rules based on multiple criteria (not only eco-
nomic impact) 
b. Creating tiers of thresholds for review—for 
example, different levels of scrutiny and 
depth of analysis for different levels of impact 
or importance of policies 
c. Proportionate analysis—adjusting the degree 
of analysis required in proportion to the im-
portance of the decision—for example, the 
policy’s likely impact, or, more accurately, the 
likely improvement in social well-being that 
the added analysis of that policy could offer, 
compared to the costs (including delay) of that 
added analysis of that policy 
9. Coalition building, such as: 
a. Enlisting other White House offices, and other 
agencies, to assist in review 
b. Creating an outside advisory body for OIRA 
(perhaps at the National Academy of Sciences, 
or similar to agencies’ science advisory boards) 
10. Presidential appointment (or removal) of agency heads 
11. Executive orders and other presidential initiatives to 
adopt policies 
12. Congressional responses, such as: 
a. Holding oversight hearings 
b. Modifying the agency’s budget 
c. Using the Congressional Review Act to re-
view a regulation 
d. Enacting legislation to rescind (or impose) a 
regulation 
e. Codifying in statute various aspects of regula-
tory review, such as RIA, CBA, and OIRA 
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oversight powers (perhaps enacting a statuto-
ry version of Executive Order 12,866) 
f. Mandating agencies to employ RIA and CBA 
notwithstanding prior statutory limitations 
g. Authorizing (without mandating) agencies in 
their discretion to employ RIA and CBA not-
withstanding prior statutory limitations 
h. Creating an office of regulatory review in 
Congress, to conduct or arrange for RIAs on 
major pending legislation (legislative impact 
assessments) 
i. Designating agencies as ”independent” (or 
not) in their own statutes and under the Pa-
perwork Reduction Act 
13. Judicial responses, such as: 
a. Applying relevant provisions of the APA or 
agencies’ authorizing statutes to require RIA 
and CBA 
b. Interpreting statutory silence to imply agency 
discretion to employ RIA and CBA (or, closely 
related, requiring Congress to use a clear 
statement in a statute to prohibit agency use 
of RIA and CBA) 
c. Subjecting agency action to a “harder look” 
where OIRA has not reviewed it 
d. Subjecting agency action to a “harder look” 
where OIRA review was negative but the 
agency then avoided OIRA to adopt the policy 
another way 
e. Deferring to OIRA review where OIRA has 
favorably reviewed the agency action (for ex-
ample, holding that a favorable OIRA review 
provides a presumption that the agency action 
is not “arbitrary” under the APA) 
f. Remanding the case to the agency (or to OI-
RA), or certifying questions to OIRA, for re-
view of technical analytic questions 
Just to repeat: This is a non-exhaustive list. There are no 
doubt other options. And we do not necessarily advocate (or 
reject) these options; our point is that a good evaluation of re-
520 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 37 
 
sponses to agency avoidance requires analysis of the costs and 
benefits of selected relevant response options. 
Further, the evaluation of response options needs to take ac-
count of the dynamic relationship between OIRA and the agen-
cies. One cannot evaluate a response measure to reduce agency 
avoidance as if it would be implemented in a static world. The 
problem of agency avoidance makes it obvious that the agency 
is a strategic actor that considers the costs and benefits of its 
own options. The agency may respond to the oversight re-
sponse measure by complying or by shifting to a new avoid-
ance tactic.242 Such shifts by agencies reacting to OIRA over-
sight are akin to the familiar phenomenon of shifts by private 
firms reacting to agency regulation.243 This dynamic relation-
ship makes the evaluation of response options more complex. 
At the same time, as noted above, the reality that OIRA and the 
agencies are “repeat players” in a multiround game may lead 
them to cooperate more, or may lead the agencies to select 
avoidance tactics that are less likely to be detected by OIRA in 
the long run. 
The avoidance-response strategic relationship is but one sub-
unit of the larger dynamic system: private activities may yield 
external harms, which agencies then regulate; private actors 
may try to avoid the agency regulation, to which the agency 
may respond; at the same time, the agency regulation is subject 
to OIRA oversight, which the agency may undergo or try to 
avoid, and avoidance may in turn elicit an oversight response. 
Each response may trigger further moves by these and other 
actors. Markets, regulation, review, avoidance, response, and 
further steps are all moves and countermoves in a strategic 
game among multiple players. The reality that the White 
House—and each agency—is a “they” and not an “it” multi-
plies the number of strategic players in this game. These multi-
ple moving parts must be assessed as an interdependent, dy-
                                                                                                                               
 242. See Raso, Strategic or Sincere?, supra note 10, at 822 (arguing that greater OIRA 
review of agency guidance documents could drive agencies to rely more on adjudi-
cation); Shapiro, supra note 12 (arguing that greater OIRA review of agency nonleg-
islative rulemaking could drive agencies to adopt even more difficult-to-monitor 
policy modes). 
 243. See John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK 
VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (John D. 
Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1995). 
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namic system. Review may elicit avoidance; a response to 
avoidance may elicit a countermove, and more beyond that.244 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Concerns about agency avoidance of OIRA may be serious, 
but the evidence is preliminary, and more empirical assessment 
is needed. Our analysis of a broader typology of avoidance tac-
tics and potential response options, situated in a continuing 
repeat-player relationship, suggests that concerns about some 
types of avoidance may be overstated, while other types de-
serve closer investigation. Further, observing avoidance does 
not by itself justify a response. There are many response op-
tions; they may be costly; and in a dynamic setting, they may 
induce cooperation or countermoves by agencies, some of 
which may be worse than the initial avoidance. Hence, we pro-
pose that the evaluation of response options to agency avoid-
ance of OIRA oversight should take an approach—akin to OI-
RA evaluation of proposed agency regulations—that assesses 
the seriousness of the problem (risk assessment), the range of 
alternative responses (including no action), and the costs and 
benefits of those alternative responses (including potential dy-
namic countermoves). 
 
                                                                                                                               
 244. See Nou, supra note 3, at 1814. Nou calls the selection of response options “the 
other half of the game” (with the first half being agency avoidance). Id. She identifies 
several response options, but she does not evaluate response options in terms of the 
further countermoves they may trigger, or their overall costs and benefits. 
